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“When We Got There, The 
Cupboard Was Bare”
Le Regiment de Hull and Kiska, 1943
G A L E N  R O G E R  P E R R A S
Abstract: In August 1943, Le Regiment de Hull, a French-speaking 
infantry battalion, part of Greenlight Force, a Canadian Army brigade, 
landed on the Aleutian Island of Kiska in tandem with a larger American 
Army force. LRH was unique, being the only Francophone Home Defence 
unit sent into combat by Canada during the Second World War. This 
paper explains how LRH was chosen, outlines the many problems it faced 
and overcame in the training process, and details how the Canadian 
Army played down or hid the linguistically-based bigotry faced by LRH 
from both Canadian and American units at Kiska.
O n 31 Decem ber  1943, Major E.T. Jacques, Le Regiment de Hull’s (lrh) acting commander, assessed lrh ’s part in 
Greenlight Force, the Canadian army brigade group that landed on 
Kiska Island that August. Certain that this “priceless experience ... 
will surely serve us in good stead when, might it be next month or 
next year that we are called upon again to do our bit in a new theatre 
of operation,” Jacques proclaimed “come what may the boys of the 1st 
Bn Le Regiment de Hull are ready.”1 C.P. Stacey, Canada’s official 
army historian, however, judged Kiska a “fiasco” as Japan’s garrison 
had fled before the attack. Prime Minister W.L.M. King, lobbied by
1 Le Regiment de Hull (LRH) War Diary, 31 December 1943, Department of 
National Defence Records, RG24, vol.15183, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).
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Winston Churchill in September 1944 to do more in the North Pacific, 
“did not wish to see our men assigned to any second Kiska role,” 
carping later that Kiska’s “expedition should never have taken place.”2
Though their regimental histories outlined how the Canadian 
Fusiliers (cdf) and Rocky Mountain Rangers (rm r) fared at Kiska, 
lrh has been largely ignored.3 In his official us army history of Canada- 
us wartime ties, Stanley Dziuban said only that lrh “was reorganized 
and equipped to provide the amphibious engineer support.” Another 
us army history about outpost defence failed to name Greenlight’s 
units. Brian Garfield’s popular Aleutian campaign chronicle alleged 
that the us military had trouble with Greenlight given language, 
“equipment, terminology, organization, and even insignia of rank.”4 
Utilising deflective passive phrasing— “it being considered desirable 
to include a French-speaking unit”— Stacey wrongly equated a 
Beach Combat Team (b c t) to us army combat engineers.5 In their 
revisionist study of Canada’s wartime effort, W.A.B. Douglas and 
Brereton Greenhous did not identify Greenlight’s formations. David 
Bercuson’s book about Canada and the Second World War made 
just a passing mention to l r h . J.L. Reginald Roy, General George 
Pearkes’ biographer, labelled the Quebecois “the life and the soul of 
the whole party.”6
Francophone writers did no better. In a 1995 edition of Bulletin 
d’histoire politique, 35 articles explaining French Canada’s part in
2 C.P. Stacey, S ix  Y ea rs  o f  W ar: T h e  A r m y  in  C a n a d a , B r i t a in  a n d  th e  P a c if i c  
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955), 500; diary, 14 September and 26 October 1944, 
W.L.M. King Diaries, LAC.
3 Bill Corfield, S i le n t  V ic to r y :  T h e  C a n a d ia n  F u s il ie r s  in  th e  J a p a n e s e  W ar  
(Surrey: Timberholme Books, 2003); Vincent Bezeau, T h e  R o c k y  M o u n ta in  R a n g e r s:  
T h e  F i r s t  10 0  Y ea rs, 1 9 0 8 -2 0 0 8  (Kamloops: Rocky Mountain Ranger Museum & 
Archives, 2008).
4 Stanley W. Dziuban, M ilita r y  R e la t io n s  B e tw e e n  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  a n d  C a n a d a  
1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 5  (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1959), 257; Stetson Conn, 
Rose C. Engleman, and Byron Fairchild, T h e  W e ste r n  H e m is p h e r e :  G u a r d in g  th e  
U n ite d  S ta te s  a n d  I ts  O u tp o s ts  (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1964), 
295-300; Brian Garfield, T h e  T h o u s a n d - M ile  W ar: W o rld  W ar I I  in  A la s k a  a n d  th e  
A le u t ia n s  (New York: Bantam Books Edition, 1982), 294.
5 Stacey, S ix  Y ea rs  o f  W ar, 498-500 and 506.
6 W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous, O u t o f  th e  S h a d o w s: C a n a d a  in  
th e  S e c o n d  W o rld  W ar  (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977), 223-224; David 
Bercuson, M a p le  L e a f  A g a in s t  th e  A x is :  C a n a d a ’s  S e c o n d  W o rld  W ar  (Toronto: 
Stoddart, 1995), 58-59; Reginald H. Roy, F o r  M o s t  C o n s p ic u o u s  B r a v e r y :  A  
B io g r a p h y  o f  M a jo r - G e n e r a l  G e o rg e R .  P e a r k e s  th ro u g h  T w o  W o rld  W ars  (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1977), 187-188.
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Rt. Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King talking with 
Major-General G.R. Pearkes during a visit 
to the 1st Canadian Infantry Division.
[Library and Archives Canada PA-132774]
the Second World War ignored lrh and Home Defence (hd) draftees. 
Yves Tremblay’s study of Quebecois volunteers mentioned lrh only 
once.7 An official history about bilingualism in Canada’s military 
agreed that as a Non-Permanent Active Militia (npam) battalion 
attached to Military District Number 3 in Kingston, Ontario, lrh 
“had to be bilingual.” Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier, however, 
misidentified lrh as an “armoured” unit, a postwar transformation.8 
Pierre Vennat’s 1997 book about Quebec’s forgotten heroes wrongly 
claimed that King had insisted that Greenlight must field a 
Francophone formation. Vennat’s 2004 biography of Dollard Menard, 
lrh ’s commander at Kiska, cited Major General T.L. Tremblay’s
7 B u l le t in  d ’h is to ir e  p o lit iq u e  3 (printemps-ete, 1995); Yves Tremblay, V o lu n ta ir e s  
D e s  Q u e b e c o is  e n  g u e r r e  ( 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 5 )  (Montreal: Athena Editions, 2006), 16.
8 Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier, F r e n c h  C a n a d ia n s  a n d  B il in g u a lis m  in  th e  
C a n a d ia n  A r m e d  F o r c e s . V o lu m e 1 ,  1 7 6 3 - 1 9 6 9 :  F e a r  o f  a P a r a lle l  A r m y  (Ottawa: 
Department of National Defence, 1986), 97 and 114. Stacey branded this tome “a 
prolonged whine, quite unworthy it seems to me of the French Canadians who have 
served in our various wars”; Stacey to W.A.B. Douglas, C.P. Stacey Papers. B90- 
0020, box 41, file DHist Corresp 1980-1988, University of Toronto Archives (UTA).
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comment to Menard “surtout que la reputation du Hull avant votre 
arrivee n’etait pas brilliante.”9
Such historiographical disregard demands rectification. Not only did 
Canadians at Kiska serve “under United States higher command and 
higher organization” for the first time, lrh was unique too as Canada 
sent no other Francophone hd unit into combat, Greenlight’s commander 
opposed lrh’s selection, and lrh became a bct, a role oft handed to black 
soldiers in a segregated us military.10 Linguistic bigotry intruded too, but 
that discussion was redacted from the Army Historical Section’s (ahs) 
Greenlight historical narrative. Stacey also censored his official history.
How did lrh find itself at Kiska? In March 1921, C.F. Hamilton, 
a Royal Canadian Mounted Police intelligence analyst, posited that 
Japan’s “intense and insular pride” would clash with America’s 
“curious and dangerous frame of mind.” As America might become 
“an uncommonly ugly neighbour” that could grab British Columbia 
(b c), Canada must become “a sufficiently powerful neutral, in 
appearance as well as reality, to impose respect upon both parties,” 
or covertly aid America.11 Although 1922’s Washington Naval Treaty 
demilitarised the Aleutians, when Brigadier General Billy Mitchell 
proposed in 1923 that Canada and America could bomb Japan from 
Aleutian bases, the Royal Canadian Navy (rcn) had hmcs Thiepval 
spy on u s , Japanese, and Soviet territories in the North Pacific in 
1924. Testing Mitchell’s notion, the us Army Air Corps sent bombers 
across Canada to Alaska in 1934. Though Canadian officers opposed 
this mission, O.D. Skelton, under-secretary of external affairs (ussea) 
did not. Upon ascertaining the flight’s true rationale, Skelton scolded 
a us diplomat that the flight “would stir up the Japanese, who are 
very suspicious anyway.”12 In January 1938, at President Franklin
9 Pierre Vennat, L e s  E e r o s  O u b lie s :  L ’h is to ir e  in e d ite  d es m ilita ir e s  c a n a d ie n s-  
fr a n g a is  de la  D e u x ie m e  G u e r r e -m o n d ia le  (Montreal: Meridien, 1997), 215-216; 
Pierre Vennat, G e n e r a l D o lla r d  M e n a r d :  D e  D ie p p e  a u  r e fe r e n d u m  (Montreal: Art 
Global, 2004), 147.
10 Stacey, S ix  Y ea rs  o f  W ar, 505.
11 C.F. Hamilton memorandum, March 1921, C.F. Hamilton Papers, vol. 3, file 12, 
LAC.
12 Galen Roger Perras, “Covert Canucks: Intelligence Gathering and the 1924 
Voyage of HMCS Thiepval in the North Pacific Ocean,” T h e  J o u r n a l o f  S tr a te g ic  
S tu d ie s  28 (June, 2005), 505-528; Galen Roger Perras and Katrina E. Kellner, “‘A 
perfectly logical and sensible thing’: Billy Mitchell’s Advocacy for a Canadian- 
American Aerial Alliance Against Japan,” T h e  J o u r n a l o f  M ili ta r y  H is to r y  72 (July, 
2008), 785-823; O.D. Skelton quoted in Roger Sarty, T h e  M a r it im e  D e fe n c e  o f  
C a n a d a  (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), 96.
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Dutch Harbor to Vancouver 1.650 Miles
Tokyo 1,000 MilesNORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
[C.P. Stacey, O fficial History o f the Canadian Arm y in the Second World War: Volum e I. S ix  
Years o f War: The Arm y in Canada, B rita in  and the Pacific]
Roosevelt’s behest, King allowed Canada’s senior officers to meet 
their u s  counterparts. But when General Malin Craig asked about 
putting u s  bases in b c , the flummoxed Canadians produced Defence 
Scheme Number 2, a posture of armed neutrality if America and 
Japan fought. In October 1938, historian Arthur Lower, citing a 
“steadily narrowing” Pacific and “vast millions on the other side” 
forcing themselves “on our attention,” publicly admonished Canadians 
for assuming that u s  Navy (u s n ) “shelter” was “automatic and of 
right.” If Japan seized the Aleutian Islands, America “would ask for, 
perhaps demand,” b c  bases.13
When King accepted Roosevelt’s 1940 offer of a Permanent Joint 
Board on Defence (p j b d ) to coordinate continental security, the Royal 
Canadian Air Force (r c a f ) and r c n  agreed to help defend Alaska. 
In July 1941, ratifying Plan a b c -22, Canada and America pledged to 
safeguard North America “to their utmost capacity.” In May 1942, 
after u s n  cryptographers exposed Japan’s Midway offensive— Japan 
bombed Dutch Harbor in the eastern Aleutians and seized Kiska
13 Joint Service Chiefs, “Defence Scheme No. 2,” 11 April 1938, file 322.016 (D12), 
Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence (DHH); 
A.R.M. Lower, “The Defence of the West Coast,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 16 
(October, 1938), 32-38.
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and Attu— us officials, citing a b c -22, sought Canadian planes for 
Alaska. While the r c af  and Canada’s Chief of General Staff (cg s) 
Lieutenant General Kenneth Stuart, oppugned us intelligence, two 
rcaf  squadrons flew to Alaska.14 15In August 1942, rcn warships went 
to the Aleutians without prior approval from Canada’s Cabinet War 
Committee (cw c).15
Canada’s army resisted longer. On 10 December 1941, although 
Canada’s chiefs of staff (cos) thought Japanese diversionary attacks 
upon the west coast could happen, Stuart would not alter dispositions 
and play “into the hands of our enemies.”16 17King, fretting that b c ’s 
invasion “seemed wholly probable,” employed journalists to force 
Stuart’s hand. Fearing for his job, Stuart created three hd divisions 
in March 1942, two in b c .17 Japan’s invasion of the Aleutians did not 
quickly alter army views. Briefing cwc on 1 July, Vice-Admiral P.W. 
Nelles contended that Japan was countering Dutch Harbor while Vice 
cgs Major General J.C. Murchie averred that Japan had attacked 
Alaska “with a probable eye on Russia.” But Canada sent three army 
hd anti-aircraft (a a ) units to Annette Island off Alaska’s Panhandle 
in September.18 One reason for this decision was strategic as the 
cos thought that Japan might raid continental America or grab the 
Queen Charlotte Islands. The second reason was political. Although 
the cos insisted on 13 August that North Pacific offensives could not
14 “Joint Canada-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2,” 28 July 1941, in David 
R. Murray, ed., D o c u m e n ts  o n  C a n a d ia n  E x te r n a l R e la t io n s . 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 1 ,  P a r t  II.  
V o lu m e 8 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1976), 249-261; W.A.B. Douglas, 
T h e  C r e a tio n  o f  a N a tio n a l A i r  F o r c e :  T h e  O f f ic ia l  H is to r y  o f  th e  R o y a l C a n a d ia n  
A i r  F o r c e . V o lu m e 2  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 412.
15 Galen Roger Perras, S te p p in g  S to n e s  to  N o w h e r e ?  T h e  U n ite d  S ta te s , C a n a d a , 
a n d  th e  A le u t ia n  I s la n d s  C a m p a ig n , 1 9 4 2 - 1 9 4 3 , PhD thesis, University of Waterloo, 
1995, 170-173.
16 “Appreciation presented by the Chiefs-of-Staff to the CWC,” 10 December 1941, 
Cabinet War Committee Minutes and Documents, RG2 7c, vol. 6, LAC.
17 Diary, 9 December 1941, King Diaries, LAC; and Stacey, A r m s , M e n  a n d  
G o v e r n m e n ts , 47m Predicting that “Japan will attack Russia in the east, Dutch 
Harbor and Alaska and British Columbia just as soon as the Japs could muster the 
men and materials” and having done “nothing to quiet the row on the Pacific coast 
for more defence,” King “egged Brucie [Hutchison] and me to keep banging away at 
the generals”; Grant Dexter memorandum, 28 February 1942, Grant Dexter Papers, 
box 3, file 21, Queen’s University Archives (QUA).
18 CWC minutes, 1 July 1942, RG2 7c, vol. 10, LAC; Order in Council PC7995, 4 
September 1942, Minutes and Orders in Council 1867-1959, RG2 1, vol. 1520, file 
2639G, LAC.
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be justified as Germany’s defeat had priority, parliamentary queries 
forced the Annette decision.19
Although initially he had agreed to retake Kiska by May 1943, 
judging Japan’s North Pacific capabilities to be overrated, at the 
January 1943 Casablanca Conference us army Chief General George 
C. Marshall approved only “operations to make the Aleutians as 
secure as possible.” That choice forced Western Defense Command 
(w d c) to delay attacking Kiska, defended by 10,000 Japanese, to 
retake a more weakly held Attu.20 Seeking an alternative supply of 
soldiers to invade Kiska by September 1943, wdc  chief Lieutenant 
General John DeWitt visited Pearkes on 19 April. While DeWitt did 
not explicitly request troops, Pearkes, fired from divisional command 
in England in 1942, eagerly proffered observers for Attu and greater 
help at Kiska.21 Stuart, though, delayed Major General Maurice 
Pope, chairing Canada’s Joint Staff Mission (cjsm) in Washington 
d c , relayed a State Department official’s request for Canadian action 
in the Aleutians. To Pope’s chagrin, Stuart initially wanted Pearkes 
to deal only with DeWitt before reconsidering and seeking Marshall’s 
view.22 When Marshall authorised DeWitt to consult Pearkes, 
DeWitt sought an infantry battalion and aa  unit to garrison Attu or
19 COS, “Japanese occupation of the Aleutian Islands,” 15 July 1942, C.G. Power 
Papers, box 70, file D-2028, QUA; COS, “An appreciation of the world military 
situation with particular regard to its effect in Canada (as of 1 July 1942),” 4 August
1942, J.L. Ralston Papers, vol. 37, file Appreciations Military Gen. (Secret 1940-42), 
LAC; COS to CWC, 13 August 1942, RG2 7C, vol. 10, LAC; CWC minutes, 26 
August 1942, Ibid.
20 Forrest C. Pogue, G e o r g e  C . M a r s h a ll:  O r g a n iz e r  o f  V ic to r y , 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 4 5  (New 
York: Viking Press, 1973), 154-155; CCS170/1, “Report to the President and Prime 
Minister,” 23 January 1943, W a r tim e  C o n fe r e n c e s  o f  th e  C o m b in e d  C h ie fs  o f  S ta ff:  
A r c a d ia , C a sa b la n c a , T r id e n t, Scholarly Resources Inc., reel 1.
21 Lt. General DeWitt to General George C. Marshall, 1 April 1943, RG165, Office 
of Chief of Staff, Top-Secret General Correspondence 1941-47, box 10, file Alaska, 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); Marshall to DeWitt, 8 April
1943, ibid., box 57, file OPD381 Security (Section II), NARA; “General Staff report 
on Greenlight Force period from inception to despatch to Adak,” July 1943, RG24, 
vol. 2921, file HQS9055-1, LAC. Pearkes was fired as “he has no brains. I consider 
he is unfit to command a division in the field”; General Bernard Montgomery to Lt. 
General H.D.G. Crerar, 25 April 1942, H.D.G. Crerar Papers, vol. 2, file 958C.09 
(D182), LAC.
22 Major General Maurice Pope to Stuart, 10 May 1943, RG24, vol. 2919, file 
HQS9055D, LAC; Stuart to Pope, 10 May 1943, file 314.009 (D49), DHH; Stuart 
to Pearkes, 11 May 1943, file 322.009 (D490), DHH; Stuart to Pope, 12 May 1943, 
RG24, vol. 2919, file HQS9055D, LAC; and diary, 3 June 1943, Maurice Pope 
Papers, vol. 1, LAC.
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Amchitka Island plus a brigade group ready for action by 1 August.23 
Presenting DeWitt’s proposals to cwc on 26 May, Stuart emphasised 
narrow service and broad national goals. First, combat experience 
would bolster draftee morale, increase army prestige, and lessen 
hostility to “zombie” conscripts. Second, by expunging foes from us 
soil, Canada would better relations with America, show resolve to 
fight Japan, and act in accord with pjbd plans.24
Certain that Stuart had contacted DeWitt, an angry Prime 
Minister King wanted to say no. But when cwc reconvened on 27 
May, King’s ire had ebbed thanks to ussea Norman Robertson. Not 
only would Aleutian combat remind Australia “the United States 
was not the only American country helping in the Pacific war,” it 
could reinforce the good impression made by r c af  planes operating 
in Alaska. Agreeing with British High Commissioner Malcolm 
Macdonald that us projects such as the Alaska Highway imperiled 
Canadian sovereignty (Macdonald used the phrase “Army of 
Occupation”), Robertson thought that troops at Kiska might balance 
those projects.25 Though he faithfully relayed Robertson’s suggestions 
to c w c , King worried that success at Kiska would accrue little credit 
while failure could cause disproportionate harm, a pointed reference 
to sharp Canadian defeats at Dieppe in August 1942 and Hong Kong 
in December 1941. A  blunter Minister of National Defence (Air) 
C.G. Power— he had opposed sending planes to Alaska and his son 
sat in a Japanese pow  camp after Hong Kong— disliked “inactive” 
garrison options. cwc agreed to help if Roosevelt or War Secretary 
Henry Stimson asked. Although Pope predicted a sharp rebuff, on 29 
May, Stimson invited “participation by the Canadian army alongside 
United States troops in the common cause, either as garrison forces 
or in offensive operations in the area in question, would be highly
23 Marshall to Pope, 23 May 1943, War Department Records, Office Director 
of Plans and Operations (OPD), RG165, box 39, file OPD 336 Security, NARA; 
Pearkes to Stuart, 23 May 1943, file 322.009 (D490), DHH.; and Pearkes to Stuart, 
25 May 1943, ibid.
24 Stuart to Ralston, 26 May 1943, RG24, vol. 2919, file HQS9055(1), LAC; CWC 
minutes, 26 May 1943, RG2 7c, vol. 13, LAC.
25 Diary, 26 May 1943, King Diaries, LAC; N.A. Robertson to King, 27 May 1943, 
W.L. M. King Papers, Memoranda & Notes, vol. 348, file 3770, LAC; Malcolm 
Macdonald to C.R. Attlee, “Notes on developments in North-Western Canada,” 7 
April 1943, Malcolm Macdonald Papers, file 12/5/1-61, Durham University Archives.
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gratifying to the United States War Department.” On 31 May, cwc 
authorised a brigade for Kiska.26
Pacific Command had 30,000 troops, 60 percent of them being 
National Resources and Mobilization Act (n r m a) draftees, but 
Pearkes cut the pool on 29 May by ruling that “ALL untrained soldiers 
had to be eliminated” from Greenlight.27 After consulting with his 
divisional commanders about the fitness of twenty infantry battalions, 
on 2 June, Pearkes, aided by Brigadiers B.N. Bostock and W.H.S. 
Macklin, selected Canadian Fusiliers, Winnipeg Grenadiers, and 
Rocky Mountain Rangers, a company of Saint John Fusiliers (sjf— a 
machine-gun unit), 24th Field Regiment Royal Canadian Artillery 
(r c a), 24th Field Company Royal Canadian Engineers (r c e), plus 
13th Brigade Headquarters (hq) and support units.28 When Pearkes 
came to Ottawa on 7 June, Stuart disqualified Pearkes’ command 
choice, Brigadier D.R. Sargent, for his low physical category. Instead, 
Dieppe veteran Brigadier Harry Foster would command while Sargent 
led training. Facing charges that ill-trained troops had died at Hong 
Kong, Stuart and Pearkes decreed that Greenlight men must have six 
months of training (later cut to four) by 1 August 1943. As it “was 
very desirable to have French-Canadian representation” so that all 
of Canada was represented, “as a result of discussion with General 
Pearkes the cgs stated that he now proposed to recommend the 
addition of Le Regt de Hull.” Stuart told Ralston on 10 June that a 
fourth battalion was needed “for relief purposes.”29
26 CWC minutes 27 and 31 May 1943, RG2 7c, vol. 13, LAC; Henry Stimson to 
Ralston, 29 May 1943, file 314.009 (D49), DHH; and Stuart to Ralston, 31 May 1943, 
RG24, vol. 2919, file HQS9055O, LAC; diary, 27 May 1943, Pope Papers, vol. 1, 
LAC; Pope to Stuart, 28 May 1943, file 314.009 (D49), DHH.
27 Colonel J.H. Jenkins to Stuart, 2 March 1943, file 122.1009 (D203), DHH; 
“Progress Report No. 112 Canadian Army,” 18 March 1943, RG24, vol. 4047, file 
NSS1078-5-18, LAC; Pacific Command staff conference minutes, 29 May 1943, file 
322.009 (D510), DHH. In July 1943, 70.7 percent of 6th Division, 68.8 percent of 
7th Division, and 72.4 percent of 8th Division were draftees; Daniel Thomas Byers, 
M o b iliz in g  C a n a d a :  T h e  N a t io n a l R e s o u r c e s  M o b iliz a t io n  A c t ,  th e  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  
N a tio n a l D e fe n c e , a n d  C o m p u ls o r y  M ili ta r y  S e r v ic e  in  C a n a d a , 1 9 4 0 - 1 9 4 5 , PhD 
thesis, McGill University, 2000, 228.
28 “Proceedings regarding co-operation with the US Army in the Aleutians,” June 
1943, RG24, vol. 13181, file May 11-June 30 1943, LAC; Captain G.W.L. Nicholson, 
“The Canadian Participation in the Kiska Operation” [Nicholson Report], December 
1943, file 595.013 (D2) DHH.
29 “Record of discussion of Military Members held 1145 Hours on Monday, 7th June 
1943,” RG24, vol. 2919, file HQS 9055-1, LAC; Stuart to Ralston, 10 June 1943, ibid.
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lrh ’s selection was indeed desirable. Perhaps 50,000 Francophones 
had served in the Great War, 8 percent of enlistments, and just 
one Francophone infantry unit, Royal 22e Regiment, had fought. 
By the Second World War, with over seventy units at least 75 
percent Francophone, Stacey put Quebec’s enlistment rate, including 
Anglophones, at 25.69 percent; the next lowest province was 
Saskatchewan was 42.38 percent (bc was highest at 50.47 percent).30 
Yves Tremblay, noting “il est impossible d’etablir avec precision 
le nombre exact de francophones par armes de service parce que 
le Forces canadiennes n’ont pas tenu de statistiques sure le sujet,” 
said that 131,618 Quebecois served, 94,500 in the army, while 
Francophone volunteers, including Acadians and Franco-Ontarians, 
numbered 55,000. While Serge Bernier put Quebec volunteers at 
161,603, with 65,000 in the army, J.L. Granatstein termed these 
figures “too generous.” Although Quebec contributed 139,000 men 
to an army strength of 708,000, half were Anglophones and 43,000 
were draftees.31 Ten percent of army officers in 1939 spoke French; 
by 1943, nine of 123 generals and eight percent of colonels could do 
so.32 While Stuart, a Trois Rivieres native who spoke some French 
and was no bigot, told King in February 1942 that he sought to avoid 
the bitter disunity that conscription had incited in 1918. Minister of 
National Defence J.L. Ralston thought that “there is only limited 
room in our army for these men. They can’t speak English. We have 
no French Canadians officers to handle them. Their fighting ability 
is questionable, etc. etc.”33
30 J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in 
the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 239; Major J.S.A Bois to Director 
Personnel Selection, “French personnel bilingualism,” 14 August 1943, RG24, vol. 
6543, file HQ650-99-12-2, LAC.
31 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 590; Tremblay, Volontaires, 13 and 
17; Serge Bernier, “Participation des canadiens frangais aux combats: evaluation 
et tentative de quantification,” Bulletin d’Historique Politique 3 (printempts-ete, 
1995), 16 and 19; J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping Peace 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 193m
32 Desmond Morton, “La penurie d’officiers francophones dans l’armee canadienne 
aux deux guerres mondiales,” Bulletin d’Historique Politique 3 (printempts-ete, 
1995), 100-102.
33 Granatstein, Canada’s Generals, 220-221, 224, and 256; Dexter memorandum, 9 
December 1941, in Frederick W. Gibson and Barbara Robertson, ed., Ottawa at War: 
The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 1939-1945 (Winnipeg: Manitoba Record Society, 
1994), 232.
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Francophone soldiers handled such attitudes variously. For Les 
Voltigeurs de Quebec (lvq), based in Ontario’s Niagara region, other 
ranks (or) read nationalist Quebec newspapers while officers perused 
Toronto Globe and Mail “with the apparent purpose of providing 
themselves with ‘good’ arguments in favour of French Canadian 
nationalism.” Less humorously, when ten b c-based units with the 
highest and lowest absent with leave (awl) rates were compared 
in 1943, the highest units had five times more Francophones. A 
December 1942 troop survey found that 83 percent of men in majority 
Francophone formations thought that gs-hd worked well. Only 34 
percent of Anglophone troops agreed; 45 percent castigated draftees 
as “French Canadian or unspecified non-Anglo-Saxon” shirkers 
seeking “safety from a country they will not protect.”34
After Vancouver Province suggested on 14 May 1943 that 
Aleutian operations would “inevitably include” Canada, Pacific 
Command asked unit commanders to gauge soldiers’ reactions. 
Brigadier H.W. Murdock of 18th Infantry Brigade, based at Nanaimo, 
said 20 percent of his men were enthused, 55 percent were willing, 15 
percent were “not anxious to fight outside of Canada,” and 10 percent 
had “protests of varying degrees.” But the willing 75 percent, who 
“will NOT go active,” wanted Ottawa to “make up its mind” while 
“willingness would be greatly lessened” if Europe was substituted 
for Japan. Esquimalt Fortress commander Brigadier J.F. Preston 
presented similar results. Though gs officers were keen, Regina Rifles 
hd personnel were “non-committal.” lrh officers welcomed the news 
but the men “did not read English speaking newspapers.”35 If such 
factors informed cwc as it pondered Greenlight’s composition on 12 
June, neither cwc minutes nor King’s diary offered much illumination. 
As “broad geographical representation” and the need for “a valuable 
reserve” required a French battalion, cwc added a French unit.36
34 Captain Jean Martin to Special Services Directorate (SSD), “Les Voltigeurs de 
Quebec,” 12 May 1942, RG24, vol. 6543, file HQ650-99-12, LAC; R.H. Roy, “Morale 
in the Canadian Army during the Second World War,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 
16 (Autumn 1986), 42; Katherine Harvie, “HD personnel,” 1 February 1943, RG24, 
vol. 6543, file HQ650-99-7, LAC.
35 “Hint Canadians to Attack in North Pacific, Must Oust Japan from Key Islands,” 
Vancouver Province, 14 May 1943; Brigadier H.W. Murdock to 6th Division HQ, 20 
May 1943, Brigadier J.F. Preston to 6th Division HQ, 19 May 1943, file 322.009 
(D490), DHH.
36 CWC minutes, 11 June 1943, RG2 7c, vol. 13, LAC; diary, 11 June 1943, King 
Diaries, LAC.
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lrh was the only Francophone infantry battalion in Pacific 
Command. Born in August 1914 as 70th Battalion, the unit, residing 
in Canada, sent men to c e f ’s 230th Overseas Forestry Battalion, a 
good job, ahs averred, as more suitable men could not “have been 
found anywhere than those of the 230th, recruited largely from those 
born and bred on the Ottawa [River].”37 Renamed Le Regiment de Hull 
by 1923, “le seul regiment de langue frangaise a l’ouest de Montreal” 
was also the only French battalion reporting to an Ontario military 
district. In August 1939, lrh personnel guarded Ottawa’s Air Station 
as war loomed.38 Prospects improved in July 1941 when National 
Defence Headquarters (ndhq), seeking “to correct the existing 
situation respecting French-Canadian units”— just 16.6 percent of 
Canadian soldiers in Britain spoke French— formed a Francophone 
15th Infantry Brigade that included lrh . Lieutenant-Colonel M.C. 
Grison took command on 20 October, but “great disappointment” 
ensued when ndhq terminated the unit’s gs recruiting in November. 
Forced to absorb lvq ’s hd men and other conscripts, lrh officers did 
not look “forward with pleasure to the task facing them of having 
charge of a battalion of “R ” recruits, in place of the home-district 
volunteers they had hoped to lead.”39
When Stuart transferred lrh to Nanaimo in April 1942, Military 
District Number 5 chief, Brigadier Georges Vanier, told lrh that 
it was a signal honour to man “an important post on the Pacific 
coast.” lrh arrived at Nanaimo on 19 April where 13th Brigade chief, 
Brigadier W.C. Colquhoun pronounced that “they were very much on 
‘active service’” as “nothing stood between them and an Axis nation 
(Japan) than the ocean.”40 lrh stood guard and trained though 378940
37 Pariseau and Bernier, 113-114; AHS, “Le Regiment de Hull (RCAC),” February 
1964, file 145.2R3 (D1), DHH.
38 L e  R e g im e n t  de H u ll  O c to b r e  1 9 8 9  (Hull: Le Regiment de Hull, 1989), 4, 
Canadian War Museum Archives (CWMA); Pierre Vennat, G e n e r a l D o lla r d  M e n a r d  
de D ie p p e  au  r e fe n d u m  (Montreal: Art Global, 2004), 146-147; “10,000 Canadian 
Militia Answer Call of Ottawa All Key Points Guarded,” T o r o n to  T e leg r a m , 22 
August 1939; Directorate Military Operations & Intelligence (DMOI) War Diary, 26 
August 1939, RG24, vol. 1252, LAC.
39 AHS, “Report No. 7, Sixth Canadian Division,” 1946, file AHQ No. 7, DHH; 
Colonel L.M. Chesley to Crerar, 24 June 1941, file 112.3S2009 (D217), DHH; AHS, 
“Report No. 6, The Employment of Infantry in the Pacific Coast Defences,” 1946, 
RG24, vol. 6921, LAC; LRH War Diary, preamble, 19 November 1941, RG24, vol. 
15182, LAC.
40 Stuart to Pacific Command, 4 April 1942, DMOI War Diary, RG24, vol. 13253, 
LAC; LRH War Diary, 14-20 April 1942, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC.
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Colquhoun claimed that 80 percent of lrh ’s men could not speak 
English and Grison admitted to a shortage of instructors qualified to 
train in English. Opposed to dispatching scarce bilingual instructors 
westward, ndhq recalled some lrh personnel to Ontario. While 
Ottawa Citizen averred “Hull Boys Learning English” on 14 May, 
if some men from “remoter rural areas” were unilingual, the “great 
majority speak English— idiom, slang, cusswords and all— with a 
fluency that would put many a Vancouver Islander to shame.”41
Changes came. lrh took in eighty-eight Francophones from Royal 
Rifles of Canada and Sault Ste. Marie and Sudbury Regiment.42 It left 
Nanaimo in October 1942 to guard Esquimalt, a move that suited the 
unit. The B ull’s Eye declared in December 1942 that as “sons of Quebec 
and daughters of bc have found that the Rockies do not divide,” lrh 
had formed an “entente tres cordiale” with Vancouver Islanders who 
respected “our individual customs of tongue and religion.”43 On 27 
February, lrh began two weeks of amphibious warfare instruction at 
the Combined Operations School at Courtenay, b c . General training 
was assessed as fair, beach protection was poor, boat discipline was 
very poor, and speed marching was poor as lrh men “were not in 
best physical condition.” As the school’s commandant commented, 
lrh training was “somewhat hampered by difficulty of language.” 
The men were “very keen” and “platoon commanders worked well to 
interpret to their men” but “briefing of platoon commanders, n c o ’s 
and men was either non-existent or incomplete.”44
Key us officers opposed using Canadian soldiers in the Aleutians. 
For Rear Admiral C.M. Cooke, the usn’s main planner, “except as an 
aid to [Canadian] morale, I see no reason for bringing them in at this 
late date in the operations. No great political benefits are apparent.”
41 Brigadier W.G. Colquhoun to Pacific Command, 24 April 1942, RG24, reel 
C4995, file 8589-73, LAC; Major General R.O. Alexander to NDHQ, 2 May 1942, 
Ibid., LAC; Lt. Colonel R.H. Keefler to Alexander, 14 May 1942, ibid.; LRH War 
Diary, 5-6 May 1942, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC; “Hull Boys Learning English,” Ottawa 
Citizen, 14 May 1942.
42 The Bull’s Eye, 15 June 1942, and LRH War Diary, 29 June 1942, RG24, vol. 
15182, LAC.
43 LRH War Diary, 1-5 October 1942, and The Bull’s Eye, December 1942, ibid.
44 Major D. Bult-Francis to 6th Division, 18 March 1943, RG24, vol. 10852, file 
23006.009 (D22), LAC. The Combined Operations School was “a misnomer” as 
neither RCAF nor RCN forces trained there although they provided resources to 
“lend realism to some maneuvers”; Major Henry Archer, report 6366, 21 November 
1944, RG127, Marine Corps Records, Entry A1 1011, History & Museums Division, 
Subject File Relating to World War II, box 1, file Alaska (General), NARA.
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Accepting Cooke’s rationale, usn Chief Admiral Ernest King would 
back Canadian participation if Marshall wanted such help. Marshall’s 
deputy, General Joseph McNarney, feared that sparse time available 
to train Canadians “would seem to limit their use to that of a floating 
reserve,” a verdict that DeWitt accepted on 31 May.45 When Pearkes 
traveled to wdc  hq in California on 11 June, Stuart cabled to ask if 
DeWitt would accept lrh . Both Pearkes’ response on 12 June plus 
a 13 June letter to Stuart from Colonel Francis Graling, us army 
attache in Ottawa, said that DeWitt would take a fourth Canadian 
battalion. But Graling intimated that DeWitt had agreed only “after 
a long discussion,” a curious phrase given DeWitt’s ardent desire 
for Canadian troops.46 DeWitt’s request for confirmation, sent via 
Pearkes on 14 June, asserting that the War Department had received 
“no notification of inclusion for R  de Hull,” caused consternation. 
Replying on 15 June that Canada had approved l r h , Stuart told Pope 
to so inform Washington, puzzling Pope who presumed “this increase 
in strength has been worked out by our respective commanders on 
the West Coast.” Bemused, McNarney seconded Pope’s view of this 
“appreciated” change.47
Why did lrh become a b c t? As relevant documents are terse 
and passively deflective, definite conclusions are difficult. Reginald 
Roy contended that Pearkes told Stuart on 7 June that us regimental 
combat teams used more engineers than Canadian brigades to manage 
beachheads. Yet that meeting’s minutes did not mention a b c t  role 
for any unit. Perhaps DeWitt, calling Pacific Command “helpless” on 
31 May and likely perturbed that Pearkes had foisted a Francophone 
unit upon him, proposed a b c t  function for lrh to bar it from an 
explicit combat role. Reporting to Stuart on 15 June, Pearkes stated 
that when he and DeWitt met General Charles Corlett, commanding
45 C.M. Cooke to Admiral Ernest King, 15 May 1943, Strategic Plans Division 
Records (SPD), Pacific Section, 1940-1946, Series XII, box 175, file Alaska Misc., US 
Navy Operational Archives Branch [OAB]; Admiral King to Marshall, 19 May 1943, 
RG165, box 39, file OPD 336 Security, NARA; Joseph McNarney to Admiral King, 
27 May 1943, ibid.; transcript DeWitt-General J.E. Hull conversation, 30 May 1943, 
RG165, OPD, Exec file 8, item 10, NARA.
46 Stuart to Pearkes, 11 June 1943, file 322.009 (D487), DHH; Pearkes to Stuart, 
12 June 1943, ibid; Colonel F.J. Graling to Stuart, 13 June 1943, RG24, vol. 2919, 
file HQS9055G), LAC.
47 Pearkes to Stuart, 14 June 1943, file 322.009 (D487), DHH; Stuart to Pearkes, 
15 June 1943, RG24, vol. 2919, file HQS 9055(1), LAC; Pope to McNarney, 16 June 
1943, file 314.009 (D49), DHH; McNarney to Pope, 17 June 1943, ibid.
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the Kiska-bound Amphibious Task Force 9 (ATF9), on 12 June—  
using the deflective passive voice— “it was agreed” that Greenlight 
would become three battalion landing groups (blgs) and “Regt de 
Hull would fulfil the duties carried out by the us Engineer Bn in the 
equivalent landing group.” Stacey’s claim that a b c t  corresponded 
to a us army combat engineer team is not entirely accurate. The 
June 1943 edition of FM21-105, Basic Field Manual Basic Engineers’ 
Handbook, omitted b c t  duties although the Corps of Engineers’ 
Pacific campaign history proclaimed that “shore party engineers” 
organised beaches and carried cargo inland.48 Despite their vital 
tasks, shore parties enjoyed less status than combat engineers and 
infantry. Fighting on Guadalcanal in 1942, combat marines shunned 
shore parties, yelling “Hell, Mac, we’re combat troops. You unload 
the goddamn stuff.” When compelled to take black recruits, the 
marine corps put 40 percent of black marines (8,000 men) in depots, 
dumps, and shore parties.49 Black men comprised 5 percent of army 
infantry in 1941-1942 but 42 percent of engineers, often assigned to 
beach support in engineer separate (labour) units.50
Arriving at Pacific Command by 17 June, Foster told Bostock 
on 21 June about problems finding suitable Francophone officers 
and asked to confer with Stuart about dropping lrh . Although 
Foster’s son labeled his father “an arch imperialist, brought up in 
the rich Edwardian traditions of King, Empire and Country” who 
disliked “Americans, French-Canadians, Jews and discrimination—  
and in that order,” Foster’s diary lacked anti-French slurs. On 21 
June, Stuart promised to replace “the useless French officers in Le 
Regiment de Hull.” While Foster judged the men as “pretty good,”
48 Roy, F o r  M o s t  C o n s p ic u o u s  B r a v e r y , 187; DeWitt-Hull transcript, 30 May 1943, 
RG165, OPD, Exec file 8, item 10, NARA; Pearkes to Stuart, 15 June 1943, RG24, 
vol. 13831, file May 11 to June 30 1943, LAC; War Department, F M 2 1 - 1 0 5 ,  B a s ic  
F ie ld  M a n u a l, E n g in e e r  S o ld ie r ’s  H a n d b o o k  (Washington DC: Department of the 
Army, June 1943); Karl C. Dod, T h e  C o r p s  o f  E n g in e e r s :  T h e  W ar A g a in s t  J a p a n  
(Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1987), 685-690 and 328-332.
49 Robert Leckie, C h a lle n g e  f o r  th e  P a c if ic :  G u a d a lc a n a l, th e  T u r n in g  P o i n t  o f  th e  
W ar  (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 52; Allan R. Millett, S e m p e r  F id e lis :  T h e  H is to r y  
o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  M a r in e  C o r p s  (New York: Free Press, 1991), 375; Morris J. 
MacGregor, Jr., In te g r a tio n  o f  th e  A r m e d  F o r c e s  1 9 4 0 - 1 9 6 5  (Washington DC: Center 
for Army History, 1989), 108.
50 MacGregor, 24; Ulysses Lee, T h e  E m p lo y m e n t  o f  N eg ro  T ro o p s  (Washington DC: 
Center of Military History, 2001), 128 and 94; Gordon L. Rottman, U S  W o rld  W ar  
T w o  A m p h ib io u s  T a c tic s :  A r m y  &  M a r in e  C o r p s , P a c if i c  T h e a te r  (Long Island City: 
Osprey, 2004), 21.
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Col. Menard. [Library and Archives 
Canada LAC 30444]
there were “too many old soft officers.” The artillery regiment 
needed “younger and more adaptable officers,” but time constraints 
prevented any changes there. When Stuart authorised Foster “to 
fire anyone I saw fit to and to ask for anyone in Canada I wanted,” 
Foster canned Sargent.51 Deeming Grison “most unsatisfactory,” 
Pearkes queried “urgently” on 14 June if Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard 
Menard, wounded at Dieppe, could lead lrh . Willing initially to 
let Menard assist training temporarily, Stuart said on 16 June that 
Menard would take over lrh on 18 June. Grison received the news 
on 16 June in Nanaimo where lrh had moved four days before.52 
lrh lacked twelve officers, and rmr , cd f , and w pg  needed sixteen,
51 Diary, 9 June 1943, Harry Foster Papers, privately held. I am grateful to J.L. 
Granatstein for access; Bostock memorandum, 21 June 1943, file 322.009 (D480), 
DHH; Tony Foster, Meeting of Generals (Toronto: Methuen, 1986), 265; diary, 2-23 
June 1943, Foster Papers.
52 Pearkes to Brigadier H.F.G. Letson, 14 June 1943, file 322.009 (D496), DHH; 
Stuart to Pearkes, 14 June 1943, RG24, vol. 2919, file HQS9055G), LAC; Pearkes to 
Stuart, 14 June 1943, ibid.; military members minutes, 16 June 1943, file 114.1009 
(D14), DHH; LRH War Diary, 12 and 16 June 1943, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC. Menard, 
a graduate from Royal Military College of Canada in 1932, served in Asia with 
British units from 1938 to 1940; Nicholson, “Amendments to narrative, the Canadian 
participation in the Kiska operation,” 29 November 1945, RG24, vol. 31916, file 
1453-7, LAC.
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eight, and six officers respectively.63 lrh lost twenty-one of thirty- 
nine officers, including second in command Major L.P. Brunet. Major 
L.J. St. Laurent, a highly regarded former lrh member, returned 
on 12 June to replace Brunet and then was plucked by Foster on 23 
June to serve in his brigade hq . Despite promises that Grison and 
Brunet would aid the transition, Macklin removed them on 24 June. 
By 5 July, Menard was satisfied with lrh ’s officers, though it had not 
been easy as Menard “ai decide que la langue de travail du regiment 
de Hull serait le frangais.” Menard, Caroline D’Amours has said, 
the youngest Lieutenant-Colonel in the Commonwealth (age twenty- 
nine), was a meticulous trainer who did not tolerate poor officers.64
Macklin cited three reasons for slashing Greenlight unit rosters 
by one-third: an army tendency to treat hd units as reinforcement 
pools rather than operational bodies; an inadequate medical boarding 
system; and too many overage officers.66 Over 200 men were scratched 
for mental instability or low intelligence, a figure that 6th Division’s 
Examiner called “rather large.” w pg  lacked eleven officers and 270 o r . 
It lost fifty-two more men in June but added 100 Midland Regiment 
personnel. r m r , short 180 men, shed another 106 troops and absorbed 534
53 Pearkes to Brigadier F. Harvey, 9 June 1943, file 322.009 (D496), DHH; Macklin 
to Colonel “A,” 10 June 1943, file 322.009 (D491), DHH.
54 LRH War Diary, 12-27 June 1943, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC; Brigadier Sherwood 
Lett to Stuart, “Liaison Report No. 8,” 23 June 1943, file 322.009 (D481), DHH; 
Macklin to Colonel “A,” 24 June 1943, file 322.009 (D496), DHH; Menard cited in 
Lett to Stuart, “Liaison Report no. 19,” 5 July 1943, RG24, reel C8428, file 9055-12, 
LAC; Bois to Director Special Services, 15 June 1943, RG24, vol. 6543, file HQ650- 
99-12-3, LAC; Menard cited in Vennat, Les Eeros Oublies, 219; Caroline D’Amours, 
“Training for Operation Jubilee: Tactics and Training in the Fusiliers Mont-Royal 
and the Dieppe Raid, 1939-1942,” Canadian Military History 22 (Autumn, 2013), 26. 
The Army’s School of Administration said St. Laurent had “youth, a broad vision, 
and an engaging personality”; Lieutenant-Colonel E.L. Caldwell to HQ Military 
District No. 4, 27 October 1941, file 324.009 (D195), DHH. Despite Menard’s claim, 
LRH’s War Diary was not written in French until September 1944; LRH War Diary, 
September 1944, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC. On 1 January 1944, LRH listed 35 officers, 
including two captains and 12 lieutenants taken on strength after 31 May 1943; 
“Seniority List,” 1 January 1944, LRH War Diary, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC.
55 Macklin, “Administrative report on Greenlight Force covering period from 
inception of project to despatch of force to Adak,” 22 July 1943, RG24, vol. 13181, 
file July 1943, LAC.
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an Edmonton Fusiliers company.56 Medical boards cut seventy-five 
lrh men by 15 June, prompting Pearkes to ask ndhq for seventy- 
five French-speaking or bilingual men. A  day later, for Greenlight 
units were not “fighting fit” given “constant taking of drafts and 
replacements of these at irregular and uncertain intervals,” Pearkes 
sought more men. Stuart opted on 16 June to draw troops from “the 
Trained Soldier Companies of Advanced Training Centres” while 
ndhq said 15th Brigade would send seventy-five men from Quebec. 
On 27 June, ndhq ordered 7th Division in the Maritimes to send 
“ 140 French speaking or bilingual full trained hd” or to l r h .57 By 24 
June, lrh had removed fifty-seven unfit o r , seventy-five or arrived 
on 26 June, another 179 or were cut by 5 July, and 138 arrived on 
5 July. lrh reached full establishment, thirty-six officers and 721 
o r , on 6 July despite ndhq ’s admission on 28 June that it could not 
send 130 Francophone soldiers before Greenlight’s departure. Pacific 
Command had to find those men despite Stuart’s promise on 30 June 
that ndhq “would find any replacements that were not available in 
Pacific Command” if Foster deleted more unfit personnel.58 lrh got 
a new Regimental Sergeant-Major on 24 June, Albert Cadotte, a 
volunteer lauded for being a twenty-one-year old rsm and his superior 
hockey skills.59
Greenlight began boarding ships on 9 July for move to the main 
Aleutian base at Adak Island on 12 July. Not all went well. Disgruntled 
men in one w pg  company, refusing to embark, tossed rifles into the 
sea. Moreover, cdf and rmr had “alarming proportions” of awls as 
men feared “being railroaded into the U.S. Army for employment in 56789
56 Captain W.A. Wilander to Major D.E. Smith, 23 June 1943, file 322.009 (D481), 
DHH; Winnipeg Grenadiers (WPG) War Diary, 1-30 June 1943, RG24, vol. 15292, 
LAC; Macklin to Colonel “A,” 10 June 1943, file 322.009 (D491), DHH; Lieutenant- 
Colonel M.L. de Rome, “TL Report No. 33,” 12 April 1943, RG24, reel C5491, file 
HQS20-3-1-11, LAC; RMR War Diary, 12 June 1943, vol. 15204, LAC.
57 Pearkes to NDHQ, 15 and 16 June 1943, file 322.009 (D491), DHH; minutes of 
military members, 16 June 1943, file 114.1009 (D14), DHH; Adjutant General Army 
(AG) to Pearkes, 16 June 1943, file 322.009 (D491), DHH; AG to 7th Division, 27 
June 1943, ibid.
58 LRH War Diary, 21, 24, and 26 June 1943, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC; LRH War 
Diary, 3-6 July 1943, ibid., LAC; Greenlight conference minutes, 28 June 1943, 
file 322.009 (D481), DHH; Stuart to Ralston, 30 June 1943, RG24, vol. 2919, file 
HQS9055O, LAC.
59 LRH War Diary, 1 December 1943, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC; District Militaire No. 
4, communique de presse, 15 Janvier 1944, Albert Cadotte Papers, Series 58A-1, file 
262.9, CWMA.
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the South Pacific.” Foster also discovered that one officer rashly had 
promised leave. Firing that “damn fool,” the “tension eased, absentees 
dropped and everyone got down to work” when Foster spoke to the 
men about security needs and England’s tough conditions.60 Bostock 
disqualified twenty-six ill-trained men at the docks on 12 July, and 
ndhq’s liaison officer to Pacific Command, Dieppe veteran Brigadier 
Sherwood Lett, listed 165 Greenlight members as aw l ; another 
ninety-one awl were apprehended before 12 July.61 w p g , c d f , r m r , 
and 24th Regiment rca  lost forty-seven, forty-two, thirty-one, and 
twenty-nine men respectively. lrh had just six awl (its diary said 
three). Exactly 4,800 men left bc on 12 July, rising to 4,887 by 23 
July as detached personnel arrived. But Greenlight’s establishment 
was 5,254.62 Macklin and Captain G.W.L. Nicholson’s ahs Greenlight 
narrative blamed the indiscipline on Greenlight’s rapid assembly as 
“men object to being tossed from unit to unit” without chances to 
know their leaders or to develop unit spirit. As for l r h , it “had suffered 
far less disruption of its other ranks than any other unit.” In 1945, 
saying that lrh had absorbed just 175 new men, Pacific Command 
emphasised the pride lrh felt in having “NO awl or deserters at the 
last minute.” lrh was an anomaly. While 499 draftees were awl in 
Canada in 1941, 3,986 deserted in 1942-1943 respectively. Losing 
just 503 awl by 31 May 1943, the army suffered 1,533 awl from June 
1 9 4 3  to January 1944, one-third of wartime desertions to date.63
On the dock, Deputy Defence Minister G.S. Currie informed lrh 
men to expect a six month mission and promised “to supply our 60123
60 WPG War Diary, 8 July 1943, RG24, vol. 15292, LAC; diary, 9 July 1943, Foster 
Papers; Foster, 265-266.
61 Bostock to Macklin, 10 July 1943, file 322.009 (D486), DHH; Lt. Colonel J.J.P. 
de Salaberry, “Reconciliation,” 12 July 1943, file 322.009 (D530), DHH; Lett to 
Stuart, “Liaison Report No. 27,” 13 July 1943. Ibid.; Stacey, Six Years of War, 500.
62 Salaberry, “Reconciliation,” 12 July 1943, file 322.009 (D530), DHH; Pearkes 
to Colonel Harrington, 12 July 1943, file 322.009 (D483), DHH; Lett to NDHQ, 
“Strength return Greenlight units as of 1700 hours on 23 July 1943,” 25 July 1943, 
RG24, vol. 2919, file HQS9055O, LAC; “Establishment 13th Cdn Inf Bde Gp,” 6 
July 1943, RG24, vol. 13181, file July 1943, LAC. LRH claims about AWL are found 
in LRH War Diary, 10-12 July 1943, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC.
63 Macklin, “Administrative arrangements for Greenlight training force,” 23 June 
1943, George Pearkes Papers, box 11, file 11.14, University of Victoria Archives 
(UVIC); Nicholson Report, paragraph 72, file 595.013 (D2), DHH; Nicholson, 
“Amendments to Narrative,” 29 November 1945, RG24, vol. 31916, file 1453-7, LAC; 
“NRMA personnel deserters— by months Jan. 1941 to date,” February 1944, RG24, 
vol. 18824, file 133.065 (D619), DHH.
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unit with French newspapers.” Selecting Menard as his second in 
command, Foster “lifted the veil of secrecy” about the mission on 13 
July and briefed lrh officers on 14 July. When or s got the news on 
16 July, their reaction, lrh ’s diarist bragged, “was most satisfactory 
and favourable. They realize a job has to be done and are willing 
to get it over as soon as possible.” Menard martially asserted that 
lrh sailed “without a kindly thought or intent aboard towards the 
little yellow cut-throat ‘sons of heaven.’” With lrh ’s diary describing 
the troops as “happy and well fed,” Foster, fearful the men “won’t 
be able to move on reaching Adak,” reduced food service. Meals 
remained so generous that Foster saw a “little French lad from Gaspe 
coming from the mess room crossing himself as he staggered to his 
bunk.”64 Keeping their side-arms, boots, and battle dress, Greenlight 
men wore us army outerwear boasting Canadian insignia. Jacques 
complained that “American gear began to roll in a bewildering flood 
with no respect for the average stature of our men.” lrh ’s diarist rued 
that “precious time was lost” finding proper equipment as “the average 
stature of the French Canadian is rather medium.” Canadian boots 
were no better as “an extraordinary proportion” of lrh men “had very 
small feet demanding an unusual number of small sizes of boots.” The 
list of personal gear each soldier took to Kiska was three pages long.65
Greenlight remade cdf , w p g , and rmr into the 14th, 15th, and 
16th us-style blgs . Each b l g , 1,167 men strong, were subdivided 
into British-style forward combat teams (f c t s) that were constructed 
around one lrh company plus support units (16 officers and 353 
or). b c t  s unloaded boats, formed supply dumps, defended beaches, 
evacuated casualties, acted as a fighting reserve, and supplied f c t  s. 
The latter task, Bostock claimed, was vital as f c t  success depended 
“upon the energy of the Beach Combat Team in pushing forward
64 LRH War Diary, 10 July 1943, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC; Pearkes to DeWitt, 12 
July 1943, file 322.009 (D486), DHH; 13th Brigade HQ diary, 13 July 1943, RG24, 
vol. 14165, file 1030, LAC; LRH War Diary, 12-16 and 21 July 1943, RG24, vol. 
15182, LAC; Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Menard, “Reports on Kiska operations, Le 
Regiment de Hull,” 1944, LRH War Diary, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC; diary, 14 and 18 
July 1943, Foster Papers.
65 Macklin, “Administrative arrangements for Greenlight training force,” 23 
June 1943, Pearkes Papers, box 11, file 11.14, UVIC; Menard, “Reports on Kiska 
operations,” January 1944, LRH War Diary, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC; LRH War 
Diary, 7 July 1943, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC; Nicholson Report, paragraph 43, file 
595.013 (D2), DHH; Lt. Colonel W.S. Murdoch, “Officers and OR’s clothing and 
equipment,” July 1943, Cadotte Papers, file 262.9, CWMA.
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supply.”66 us experts came to bc while Canadians went to Seattle 
and Fort Ord, California, a t f 9’s training centre, to study amphibious 
warfare, us weapons, and lessons learned at Attu where fighting had 
killed 549 Americans and injured 2,350 (a 19 percent loss rate). On 23 
June, lrh personnel attended a ship loading course in Nanaimo. Five 
days later, a senior us army officer schooled Menard in amphibious 
warfare while a Canadian observer sent to Attu lectured lrh officers 
about that bitter campaign.67 On 19 June, Pacific Command ordered 
four lrh officers to San Diego “for a period of instruction” at 
Amphibious Corps Pacific Force. But they arrived instead at Fort 
Ord. Major J.L. Black, a Pacific Command liaison officer, encountered 
the lrh officers at Fort Ord on 21 July. As they had not been paid 
since 23 June, Black told this “very discouraged group of boys” to get 
loans from the post welfare officer and then ensured their transfer to 
Adak with the us army’s 87th Mountain Regiment.68
Training at Adak, already intense in bc (Pacific Command listed 
twenty-nine tasks to master), heightened. As Attu’s campaign had 
revealed that troops must be in superb condition and habituated 
to harsh weather plus steep terrain, the emphasis was on platoon 
level battle drill, understanding Japanese tactics, and physical 
conditioning.69 Over 150 marines put ATF9 through its amphibious 
warfare paces as the corps was required to train all troops going to 
the Pacific. On 27 July, marines lectured Greenlight about blending 6789
66 Nicholson Report, paragraphs 16-17, file 595.013 (D2), DHH; and Bostock, 
“Training instruction ‘Green Light’ directive no. 2,” 14 June 1943, file 114.1009 
(D14), DHH. Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Wilson, commanding WPG, said that US 
officers dropped “combat group” and “shore party” for the British terms FCT and 
BCT; J.A. Wilson, “Kiska Ops,” 1943, John Anderson Wilson Papers, file Kiska 
Operation, Glenbow Museum Archives. Menard listed 27 BCT duties; Menard to 
Stacey, 10 January 1946, RG24, vol. 31916, file 1453-7, LAC.
67 Nicholson Report, paragraph 94, file 595.013 (D2), DHH; Galen Roger Perras, 
S te p p in g  S to n e s  to  N o w h er e:  T h e  A le u t ia n  Is la n d s , A la s k a , a n d  A m e r ic a n  M ili ta r y  
S tra teg y , 1 8 6 7 - 1 9 4 5  (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003), 133; 
LRH War Diary, 23 and 28 June and 5 July 1943, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC.
68 Major G.S. Oldfield to Foster, 19 June 1943, file 322.009 (D500), DHH; LRH War 
Diary, 23 June 1943, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC; diary, 21 July 1943, in Larry Black 
and Galen Roger Perras, ed., B l a c k ’s  W ar: F r o m  N e w  B r u n s w ic k ’s  8 th H u s s a r s  to  
C a li f o r n ia ’s  C o r l e t t ’s  ‘L o n g  K n i v e s , ’ 1 9 4 1 - 4 4  (Waterloo: LCMSDS Press of Wilfrid 
Laurier University, 2013), 152-153.
69 Pacific Command, “Memo of some points to be covered in training,” 27 June 
1943, RG24, vol. 2920, file HQS9055-1, LAC; Perras, S te p p in g  S to n e s  (book), 133 
and 252-253; 13th Brigade HQ, “Training directive no. 1,” 7 July 1943, file 148.9009 
(D6), DHH.
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artillery, air support, communications, and engineers in an assault 
landing. Marine Major W.R. Lytz schooled lrh in shore party 
doctrine from 28-30 July.70 Foster got on well with Alaska’s crusty 
senior marine, General Holland Smith. When Smith queried why 
Canadians shaved daily, Foster said “I tell them I don’t want them 
looking like a bunch of bloody Americans.” us army officers, taking “a 
rather dim view of a bunch of Marines coming up there to tell them 
what to do,” denied Smith’s aide, Colonel Graves Erskine, access to 
atf  9’s battle plan. Having complained to Pearkes about Sargent’s 
anti-Americanism, Erskine found Foster to be “a hard charger in 
every way.” When Erskine complained that Canadian practice artillery 
fire on Adak nearly had struck us troops, Foster responded that the 
“goddamned Americans” would “never learn how to win a battle” with 
such precautions. Though Erskine said Greenlight “would have been 
wonderful in battle” had the Japanese stayed, there had been “quite 
a go-around” with French-speaking shore parties. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Robert Hogaboom was less impressed. While us soldiers “reacted very 
well to [marine] supervision,” Canadians— Hogaboom worked with l r h , 
r m r , and “Winnipeg Fusiliers [sic]”— were “completely indifferent”; 
when Hogaboom spoke, Canadians “would deliberately prop their feet 
up on the benches and rock their heads back and go sound asleep.”71 
After Smith convinced Corlett to mount a practice drill, ATF9 
units landed on Great Sitkin Island on 3 August before returning to 
Adak on 7 August. lrh ’s “A” Company moved supplies 600 yards 
inland without delay, a job that w p g ’s diarist called “difficult and 
important.” Jeeps had to move material cross-country, machinery 
noise drowned out a public address system on the beach, and a paucity 
of wireless sets compelled the use of runners. The return to Adak
70 Joint Planning Committee to Joint Board, “Joint plan for Army and Navy 
amphibious combat training,” 9 September 1941, RG127, Entry Ai 1011, box 2, 
file 6, NARA; “Summary of amphibious training” 1952, ibid., box 2, file 6, NARA; 
Fifth Amphibious Corps HQ, “War journal of forward echelon, Amphibious Corps, 
Pacific Fleet; operations for occupation of Kiska,” 24 October 1943, RG127, Entry 
A1 1051, Geographic Area Files, box 1, file A3-1, NARA; Captain R.F. Benjamin 
to Commander North Pacific Force, “Personnel for forward echelon, headquarters 
Amphibious Corps Pacific Fleet,” 12 August 1943, RG127, Entry A1 1010, History 
& Museums Division, Records Amphibious Corps 1940-46, box 16, file 2385 Strength 
& Distribution, NARA; LRH War Diary, 28-30 July 1943, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC.
71 Foster, 273; G e n e r a l G r a v e s  B .  E r s k in e  O ra l H is to r y  T r a n s c r ip t  (Washington DC: 
Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1975), 298-312; L ie u t e n a n t  G e n e r a l  
R o b e r t  E . H o g a b oo m  O ra l H is to r y  T r a n s c r ip t  (Washington DC: Marine Corps History 
and Museums Division, 1972), 169-171.
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went better as usn “coxswains were far more on their toes.”72 Marine 
Captain J.B. O ’Neill, attached to l r h , said that as usn crews “did 
not understand their work,” many troops had been submerged. lrh 
“worked practically continuously up to 0400, 8 August,” shore party 
morale “was very high, though they were practically all drenched 
and cold,” and shore parties were “well organized and very efficient.” 
By contrast, Erskine called us army’s 17th Regiment beach party, a 
formation that had served at Attu, “a disorganized mob.”73
On 11 August, 35,000 atf  9 soldiers left Adak. Once a naval 
diversion drew attention to Kiska’s southeast coast on 15 August, the 
Canada-us First Special Service Force (ssf) would spearhead landings 
on Kiska’s northwest. On 16 August, Greenlight would splash ashore 
on Kiska’s northern reaches, with lrh providing the beach parties in 
Greenlight’s sector.74 According to Jacques, lrh men, crammed with 
other troops and supplies on uss David Branch, had their “morale 
and fighting spirit ... whipped up to a keen edge,” all being “imbued 
with the urge to get this over with and go home to a liveable climate.” 
Foster’s brigade hq, also on David Branch, prompted by Menard, 
sang “Alouette.” Disaster nearly ensued when a fire erupted on David 
Branch. Sergeant J. Iannuccilli of lrh entered the stricken hold with 
a winch line so that the burning cargo box could be extracted before 
it ignited gasoline and ammunition. Origene Poulin, an nrma  or sent 
to lrh in June, said that Menard had told him “I am certain that
72 H.M. Smith to Commandant Marine Corps, “War diary, Forward Echelon, 
Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet: Operations against Kiska,” 27 October 1943, 
Marine Corps Records, Reference Section, file Alaska, Marine Corps Historical Center 
(MCHC); WPG War Diary, 3 August 1943, RG24, vol. 15292, LAC; Lieutenant- 
Colonel W.S. Murdoch, “Operation order no. 2,” 5 August 1943, file 595.013 (D4), 
DHH; LRH War Diary, 3-7 August 1943, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC; 13th Brigade HQ 
diary, 3-7 August 1943, RG24, vol. 14165, file 1030, LAC.
73 Captain J.B. O’Neill, “Medical activities of 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
during period 3 Aug-fAug 1943,” 8 August 1943, RG127, Entry A1 1010, box 14, 
file 2295-5 Reports-Observers #1, NARA; Colonel G.B. Erskine to Commanding 
General Alaskan Command Pacific Force, “Landing exercises executed by 1st 
Battalion 17th Infantry on Beach Red-2, 4 August 1943,” 6 August 1943, ibid., box 
15, file 2295-5-15 Report Observers Kiska, NARA.
74 Task Force 16, “Operation Plan No. 6-43,” 6 August 1943, Adjutant General’s 
Records, World War II Operations Reports 1940-48, American Theater, RG407, file 
91-TF2-0.3, NARA; 13th Cdn Inf Bde, “Operation Order No. 1,” 9 August 1943, file 
595.023 (D2), DHH.
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I am going to die” on Kiska, convincing Poulin “we were going to a 
nasty place.”75
By nightfall on 15 August, 7,000 Allied troops were on Kiska. 
On 16 August, as a beach assigned to us forces was too rocky, 
landing craft switched to Greenlight’s congested Green Beach. 
c d f ’s displeased diarist called usn crews undisciplined liars, while 
Colonel N.C. Sherman, a Pacific Command observer, alleged the usn 
“managed to botch the works thoroughly whenever they have touched 
land affairs.” a t fq ’s us assistant chief of staff was blunter. usn refusals 
to shift boats from congested beaches would have wiped out atf  9’s 
first wave, “not due to the enemy contact, but primarily due to the 
fact that additional troops could not have been landed in sufficient 
quantities with proper supplies to reinforce the beachhead.”76 The 
14th f c t  hit Green Beach at 9:10 a.m. on 16 August, followed by 
15th f c t  and 16th f c t  by noon, pushed by Foster “with all haste” 
to grab high ground before enemy counter attacks came. Jittery men 
beset by thick fog shot recklessly. One cdf soldier’s spine was severed 
by friendly fire on 16 August. ssf disseminated so much friendly fire 
that Canadian soldiers, Nicholson claimed, found that “a brisk return 
of machine gun fire was the most effective method” to curtail it. 
Thirty Canadians were wounded or fell ill.77 Twenty-eight Americans 
died, most from friendly fire. Seventy usn sailors died when their ship 
struck a mine on 17 August.78
75 Menard, “Reports on Kiska operations,” 1944, LRH War Diary, RG24, vol. 
15183, LAC; Bde HQ diary, 11 August 1943, RG24, vol. 14165, file 1030, LAC; 
LRH War Diary, 11 August 1943, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC; Foster, “Reports on acts 
of courage,” 20 August 1943, RG24, vol. 31916, file 1453-7, LAC; Origene Poulin 
transcript, available at www.thememoryproject.com.stories/2193:origene-poulin/.
76 Transport Quarter Master 14th FCT report, December 1943, RG24, vol. 15032, 
file CDF War Diary December 1943, LAC; Colonel N.C. Sherman, “Alaska trip,” 22 
September 1943, file 322.009 (D711), DHH; Kenneth A. Ward report, 1943, RG407, 
file 91-RF2-0.3, NARA.
77 Diary, 16 August 1943, Foster Papers; CDF War Diary, 16 August 1943, RG24, 
vol. 15032, LAC; Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. Beattie to 13th Bde HQ, 4 October 
1943, in Nicholson Report, Appendix 37, file 595.013 (D2); DHH; Nicholson Report, 
paragraphs 123-125, 129, 131, and 195, file 595.013 (D2), DHH.
78 Charles R. Shrader, A m ic id e :  T h e  P r o b le m  o f  F r ie n d ly  F ir e  in  M o d e r n  W ar  
(Fort Leavenworth: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), 
91. Four of twenty-one Americans killed by 21 August died in Greenlight’s sector; 
assistant chief of staff ATF9 to Alaska Defense Command Advanced HQ, “Narrative 
of events of Landing Force 16.8,” 13 October 1943, James V. Forrestal Papers, box 
153, item 87, Mudd Library, Princeton University.
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Canadian and US forces landing at Kiska, August 19437. [United States Navy usn 42784]
Kiska’s invasion was uncontested as Japan’s untenable garrison 
had withdrawn covertly on 29 July. Though us intelligence assumed 
the enemy was holed up on Kiska’s high ground or on nearby islands, 
certain the Japanese had left, Smith had demanded a reconnaissance 
in force. us commanders rejected that option as it would telegraph 
the attack. Smith, possessing contempt for “Generals who were 
Admirals and Admirals who wanted to be Generals,” became “the 
object of ridicule.”79 Greenlight hq ’s diarist thought the Japanese had 
gone to ground and “ours will be the long hard job of digging them 
out.” Pearkes had expected Greenlight to suffer 20 percent casualties. 
After inspecting Kiska’s formidable defences, DeWitt put potential 
a t f 9 losses at 5,000 dead.80 Booby-traps killed rmr Lieutenant S. 
Vessey on 17 August and w p g ’s Private P. Poshtar on 22 August, 
and lrh lost two men given what Pacific Command observer Major 
G. Sivertz called a “child-like desire to fire Japanese grenades and 
mortars.” After four lrh men left camp on 28 August to examine a
79 Perras, Stepping Stones (book), 154-155; Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, 
Coral and Brass (Washington DC: Zenger Publishing, 1948), 21 and 106.
80 13th Cdn Bde HQ diary, 9 August 1943, RG24, vol. 14165, file 1030, LAC; 
Pearkes to Letson, 10 July 1943, file 322.009 (D497), DHH; DeWitt cited in The ONI 
Weekly, 25 August 1943, file 112.3M1013 (D6), DHH.
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Japanese ammunition cache, Private G. Boisclair fatally mishandled 
a grenade. On 29 August, Private G. Desjardin struck a bomb with a 
shovel. Foster, witnessing the incident, said a dismembered Desjardins 
was “blown over a cliff.”81
Menard had divided lrh into functional groups: an hq; a beach 
section subdivided into ammunition, labour, general duty, and 
evacuation parties; a defence group; traffic controllers; a medical unit; 
and a supply dump. Aided by extra men that enlarged Menard’s 
command to 1,600 personnel, lrh so impressed Corlett that he gave 
it control over supplies meant for two us beaches.82 Nicholson said 
that lrh ’s “magnificent” work kept Green Beach clear as men battled 
icy surf to unload boats and removed eighty land-mines on the beach 
after an explosion catapulted a us jeep. When Corlett froze usn 
deliveries on 19 August to allow bcts  to segregate stores by units, 
lrh personnel hiked five times daily inland to deliver 150 tons of 
material. While bcts  were dismantled on 23 August, lrh remained 
on Green Beach until 11 September when it moved to Greenlight’s 
encampment at Kiska’s harbor and began building roads.83
On 18 August, Greenlight’s hq war diary wrote that “massed 
beach teams of the three blgs  (under Lieutenant-Colonel Menard) 
have worked long and hard judging by reports reaching us.” Finding 
it “very unpleasant to land from an lst  [landing ship tank] and 
have a green roller sweep up over your head,” Sherman said Menard 
“had things well under control and well organized.” While Sivertz 
complained that medical officers had not inspected Green Beach 
and that “human excreta littered the camp,” lrh deserved “special 
praise” as Green Beach “was clear of all material long before the 
American beach was organized” despite “mud and wet ... comparable
81 RMR War Diary, 17 August 1943, RG24, vol. 15204, LAC; WPG War Diary, 
22 August 1943, RG24, vol. 15292, LAC; Major G. Sivertz, “Kiska operations 
observations,” 22 August 1943, file 322.009 (D878), DHH; LRH War Diary, 29 
August 1943, plus statements of Lt. G.A. Chagon and three witnesses, 31 August 
1943, RG24, vol. 15182, LAC; LRH War Diary, 28 September 1943, RG24, vol. 
15183, 1943, LAC; Foster cited in 13th Bde HQ diary, 29 August 1943, RG24, vol. 
14165, file 1030, LAC.
82 Menard to Stacey, 10 January 1946, RG24, vol. 31916, file 1453-7, LAC; Nicholson 
Report, paragraphs 135-136, file 595.013 (D2), DHH; Nicholson, “Amendments to 
narrative,” 29 November 1945, RG24, vol. 31916, file 1453-7, LAC.
83 Nicholson Report, paragraphs 138-145, file 595.013 (D2), DHH; 13th Bde HQ 
diary, 23 August 1943, RG24, vol. 14165, file 1030, LAC; 24th Field Company RCE 
diary, 31 August 1943, RG24, vol. 14751, LAC.
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to conditions at Paaschendaele [sic].” But though Foster acknowledged 
on 4 September that lrh “crested an all time record by unloading 
90,000 tons of stores by hand in two weeks,” he also had commented 
on 22 August that “an improvised beach organization” by definition 
was untrustworthy. rmr  commander Lt. Colonel D.B. Holman 
wanted b c t  s to be battalion-sized as Greenlight’s b c t  was so small 
that front-line units would have had to retrieve supplies had the 
invasion met opposition.84
Unfortunately, personal gear piled on beaches was looted. Though 
some Canadians were implicated, the Brigade hq diarist alleged 
that us troops perpetrated most thefts. r c e ’s commander, calling 
discipline on Green Beach “deplorable,” said stores “were openly 
looted and rifled.” Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. Beattie of cdf backed 
“strong action” against looters. w pg  commander, Lieutenant-Colonel 
J.A. Wilson, complaining that “Canadian and American” personnel 
had freely looted, wanted looters “shot.” Even 19th Field Security 
Section was victimised, compelling its diarist to state “what with 
watching Le Regiment de Hull and the Americans we have quite a 
time.” Only rmr  castigated its own men as “a cheerful, if somewhat 
light fingered crowd.” While Jacques did not blame lrh personnel, 
“inveterate souvenir hunters” had neglected the “fearful consequences 
that might occur from their ‘scrounging’ should the enemy counter­
attack and essential supplies and rations be found missing.”85
Prime Minister King took to the radio on 21 August to display 
his commitment to the Pacific war despite Pope’s report that a 
chagrined usn would not publicise an unopposed invasion. Eager to 
show that Canada had “joined with the Americans in protecting the 
Alaskan and Aleutian areas,” King, backed by Power who thought
84 13th Bde HQ diary, 17 August 1943, RG24, vol. 14165, file 1030, LAC; Sherman, 
“Alaska Trip,” 22 September 1943, file 322.009 (D711), DHH; Sivertz, “Kiska 
operations observations,” 22 August 1943, file 322.009 (D878), DHH; diary, 4 
September and 22 August 1943, Foster Papers; Lieutenant-Colonel D.B. Holman, 
“Report on Kiska operation 1st Bn Rocky Mountain Rangers,” 3 September 1943, 
RMR War Diary, RG24, vol. 15205, LAC.
85 13th Bde HQ diary, 21 August 1943, RG24, vol. 14165, file 1030, LAC; Major 
D.H. Rochester to Foster, “Report on Kiska operations,” 5 September 1943, 24th 
Fd Coy RCE War Diary, RG24, vol. 14751, LAC; Beattie, “14th Combat Team 
Memorandum Report on Greenlight Training,” December 1943, CDF War Diary, 
RG24, vol. 15032, LAC; Wilson to Foster, 28 August 1943, WPG War Diary, RG24, 
vol. 15292, LAC; FSS War Diary, 7 September 1943, RG24, vol. 6398, LAC; RMR 
War Diary, 22 August 1943, RG24, vol. 15204, LAC; Menard, “Reports on Kiska 
operations,” 1944, LRH War Diary, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC.
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Canadian Army camp at Kiska in the Aleutian Islands, August 1943. [Library and Archives 
Canada C-008021]
that b c , “the Liberal Party’s blackest spot,” would be grateful “the 
Japanese menace” was vanquished, outlined Greenlight’s rationale 
and named units and commanders.86 King’s gambit worked. 
Winnipeg Free Press and New York Times played up revenge for 
Hong Kong’s defeat, Toronto Daily Star noted Canada’s Pacific 
role, and New York Times and Washington Post carried King’s 
statement. Vancouver Province, posting nine articles about Kiska 
on 21 August, crowed that Kiska marked the “first time that 10,000 
Japs sneaked home.” New York Times said Greenlight’s men had 
shown “real delight” at Kiska, while Toronto Globe and Mail quoted 
rca  Major George Edwards as feeling “cheated” by the absence of 
combat. Though “nobody could ever say truthfully that he regrets 
there was no battle,” Foster added “we’re extremely lucky to get
86 King, “Memorandum re participation of Canadian forces in operations in Alaskan 
and Aleutian areas,” 21 August 1943, King Papers, Memoranda & Notes, vol. 361, 
file 3853, LAC; Pope to Stuart, 20 August 1943, RG24, vol. 2921, file HQS9055-1, 
LAC; Power, “Federal general elections in 1943,” 21 July 1943, Power Papers, box 
1, file I Correspondence (a) Political Jottings, QUA; King, “Canadian forces in the 
North Pacific: Alaska and the Aleutians,” 21 August 1943, King Papers, Memoranda 
& Notes, vol. 361, file 3853, LAC.
29
: Le Regiment de Hull and Kiska, 1943
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
88  : L e  R e g im e n t  de H u ll  a n d  K is k a , 1943
An unidentified infantryman of Le Regiment de Hull getting a haircut, Kiska, Aleutian 
Islands, August 1943. [Library and Archives Canada PA-168353]
anything as valuable as Kiska without having to fight for it.”87 Le 
Devoir played up the bilingual statement that Roosevelt and King, 
in Quebec City to meet Churchill, made about Kiska. Montreal’s La 
Presse, announcing “Kiska pris sans coup ferir,” cited Menard and 
Lieutenant-Colonel T.M. Brown, the Montrealer commanding 25th 
Field Ambulance. Montreal Gazette, having called on 7 August for 
Zombies to fight in the Aleutians, dedicated eight articles to Kiska 
on 23 August.88 Ottawa-Hull’s Le Droit, stating on 23 August “que 
les gars de Hull ferent rejailler beaucoup de gloire sur toute la ville” 
and “les kakis de Hull ne sont plus qu’a mi-chemin de Tokio,” noted
87 “Kiska Is Grenadiers’ First Step on Road to Hong Kong,” Winnipeg Free Press 23 
August 1943; “Canadians Have 2nd Pacific Show,” New York Times, 22 August 1943; 
“Canada in the Aleutians,” Toronto Daily Star, 23 August 1943; “Joint Statement 
on Kiska is Issued,” New York Times, 22 August 1943; “Quebec Hails US-Canada 
Kiska Action,” Washington Post, 22 August 1943; “First Time 10,000 Japs Sneaked 
Home,” Vancouver Sun, 21 August 1943; “Canadians in Kiska Force Adopt US Army 
Insignia to Link Units,” New York Times, 30 August 1943; “Kiska Canucks ‘Let 
Down’ Guelph Officer Reveals,” Toronto Globe and Mail, 26 August 1943.
88 “L’occupation de l’ile de Kiska par les troupes etatsiniennses at Canadiennes,” 
Le Devoir, 23 aout 1943; “Kiska pris sans coup feris,” La Presse, 23 August 1943; 
“Are the Zombies Going to Kiska?” Montreal Gazette, 7 August 1943; “King Gives 
Names,” Montreal Gazette, 23 August 1943.
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lrh ’s “role tres important a Kiska” on 30 August and dedicated an 
entire page on 1 September to lrh photos.89
When Nicholson visited Kiska in November 1943, Anglophone 
troops groused that lrh “had received an undue share of the publicity 
over its part in the Kiska operations, and this suspicion may have 
led to a touch of jealousy in minds that were none too occupied 
by the distraction that Kiska had to offer.” Evidence disputes this 
claim. While Toronto Daily Star noted Quebec’s representation in 
Greenlight, declining to name l r h , said that “a verse or two of a 
French-Canadian song” was heard as men embarked in b c . Toronto 
Telegram charged that it was inconsistent to use draftees at Kiska 
but not in Europe. Toronto Globe and Mail cited lrh on 23 August 
without explaining lrh ’s actual role and discussed b c t  duties 
without mentioning lrh on 27 August.90 Journalist James Maclean 
of Maclean’s Magazine heard “strains of ‘Alouette,’ deep-throated 
from the men of the Regiment de Hull in a transport ahead of ours” 
as ATF9 neared Kiska. Only Hamilton Spectator played up l r h ; 
“the Mikado’s men, Canada may rest assured, will find little to their 
liking the cold steel of French-Canadian bayonets. They are wielded 
by men whose powerful biceps are a heritage from forbears who from 
dusk to dawn made the woods of the Ottawa valley ring to the sound 
of their axes.”91
Major A.R. Armitage, an ordnance specialist sent by ndhq, 
thought lrh had done well given that Menard lacked b c t  organisational 
plans until 28 July. Armitage had sought more landing exercises as 
Great Sitkin had been “confusing” as some beach teams were poorly 
trained. As language difficulties were most acute when Francophones 
worked “with us personnel both aboard ships, in landing craft, 
and even on the beach” and interpreters were not always available,
89 “Le Regiment de Hull est debarque a Kiska,” L e  D r o it , 23 August 1943; “Le 
Regiment de Hull a joue un role tres important a Kiska,” L e  D r o it , 30 August 1943; 
“Militaires du Regiment de Hull a Kiska,” L e  D r o it , 1 September 1943.
90 Nicholson Report, “Appendix 54: Note on Le Regiment de Hull,” 11 December 1943, 
file 595.013 (D2) DHH; “All Parts of Canada Represented in Force which Captured 
Kiska,” T o r o n to  D a ily  S ta r , 21 August 1943; “Kiska Operation Reveals Government’s 
Inconsistent Policy,” T o r o n to  T eleg ra m , 24 August 1943; “Famous Canadian Units 
Represented at Kiska,” T o r o n to  G lo b e  a n d  M a il, 23 August 1943; “Planned Drive on 
Kiska Said ‘Home Defence.’” T o r o n to  G lo b e a n d  M a il, 27 August 1943.
91 James A. Maclean, “Kiska Canucks,” M a c le a n ’s  M a g a z in e , 1 October 1943; 
“French-Canadian Regiment Adding to Proud Record,” H a m ilto n  S p e c ta to r , 27 
August 1943.
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Armitage recommended using only Anglophone units in beach and 
ship work. As Armitage’s views must inform use of Francophone 
troops for “we must employ them ... as they are valuable troops 
in any event,” Macklin asked on 31 August for Foster’s opinion. 
Describing lrh ’s performance as excellent, Foster admitted “some 
difficulty was experienced” given “the large number of personnel who 
did not speak or understand English.” However, such “difficulty was 
more apparent in a unit called upon to work on close co-operation 
with others than in circumstances where the unit could work intact 
under its own Offrs & n c o ’s .”92
Lieutenant-Colonel R.P. Drummond of 24th Field Regiment rca  
presented “an Artillery viewpoint.” Attributing “rampant” looting 
to poor unit discipline, he thought a military police “cordon” should 
have secured the beaches and work parties “should have been under 
command of a competent officer.” Further, an Anglophone unit should 
“be used as a Beach Combat Team owing to difficulty experienced in 
understanding each language by various people.” Menard vehemently 
disagreed. Averring that the beach ran “smoothly at all times,” 
whenever trouble ensued, its source “was always 24th Fld Regt r c a .” 
Drummond and his adjutant instructed rca  men to disregard all but 
their orders, while a Captain Edgar, a self-proclaimed “westerner,” 
expressed distaste for French-Canadians and told his men “NOT to 
obey orders from a French-Canadian officer— unless he was there.” 
Denouncing Edgar’s “lack of intelligence and breeding” and claiming 
that he never “seen such a non-cooperative unit,” if the invasion had 
met resistance, Menard was sure “quite a few” rca  men would have 
died “had they refused to take orders except those from one officer 
of 24th Fld r c a .”93 In a postwar memoir, rca  officer Captain James 
Munro claimed there had been trouble on David Branch. With too 
few bunks available in a hold already occupied by lrh soldiers, Munro 
boasted that “our fellows bedded down, only six of the Frenchmen 
being killed in the ensuing conflict.” If Munro’s claim was a jest, 
Beattie’s report was no joke. While “the happiest of relations existed 923
92 Major A.R. Armitage, “Report on the loading and unloading of the 13th Cdn 
Inf Bde’s stores and equipment during operations with ATF9,” 30 August 1943, file 
322.009 (D878), DHH; Macklin to Bostock, 31 August 1943, file 322.009 (D521), 
DHH; Foster to Pearkes, “Report on Kiska operation 13th Cdn Inf Bde,” 3 September 
1943, Ralston Papers, vol. 37, file Aleutian Islands General (Secret), LAC.
93 Major R.P. Drummond to Foster, 25 August 1943, 24th Fd Regt War Diary, 
RG24, vol. 14358, LAC; LRH War Diary, 4 September 1943, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC.
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Infantrymen of Le Regiment de Hull waiting 
to board ships taking part in Operation 
COTTAGE, the invasion of Kiska, Aleutian 
Islands. Nanaimo or Chemainus, British 
Columbia, Canada, 12 July 194. [Library and 
Archives Canada PA-168356]
between all officers” in 14th f c t  regardless of language, as it had 
been “sometimes difficult to keep racial and language friction under 
control” among o r  s, “teams should be made up as far as possible 
from either all English speaking or all French speaking personnel.”94 
Greenlight produced short-term improvements in the h d  army. On 
Kiska, a spirited and morale-boosting intra-Brigade softball league 
culminated in an l r h  championship on 8 November.”95 In Canada, 
as Special Service Directorate (s s d ) reported in November 1943, for 
104 h d  units with French minorities, “the proportion reporting good 
adaptation has increased since the last check-up from 50 [percent] 
(February 1943) to 78 [percent] (September 1943).” However, English 
minority adaptation in Francophone units was 100 percent and 88 
percent for other minorities serving in Anglophone or Francophone 
formations. When 203 h d  units submitted morale reports in August, 
12 percent indicated that h d  men had noted Kiska’s invasion as
94 Captain James Munro, “We Take Kiska,” undated, James Munro Papers, Series 
58A-1, file 247.9, CWMA; Beattie, “14th Combat Team memorandum report on 
Greenlight training,” December 1943, CDF War Diary, RG24, vol. 15032, LAC.
95 Nicholson, “Amendments to narrative,” 29 November 1945, RG24, vol. 31916, file 
1453-7, LAC; CDF War Diary, 17 October 1943, RG24, vol. 15032, LAC; CDF War 
Diary, 8 November 1943, RG24, vol. 15032, LAC.
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opposed to five percent for the Russian front, general news at 34 
percent, and the Sicilian campaign at 27 percent (15 percent had 
“little or no interest” in news). Awareness of Kiska plummeted to 
three percent in September as interest in Italy’s invasion surged.96
Stuck on Kiska, Greenlight h q  also investigated “personnel racial 
extraction.” The largest group, 2,066 men, 42.5 percent, had British 
origins. Troops with Slavic roots amounted to 720 men, 14.9 percent, 
and there were 990 “others,” 20.4 percent. Greenlight had 1,079 
French soldiers, 22.2 percent, with 710 in l r h  (l r h  had thirty-seven 
non-French soldiers), sixty-eight each in c d f  and w p g , thirty-two 
in r m r  2, and fifty-six in s j f , 39 percent of its strength. Brigade h q  
boasted forty British (66 percent) and seven French personnel (11.5 
percent); 24th r c a  had forty-six French troops (seven percent). Using 
Canada’s 1941 Census, British and French personnel were under­
represented, below 47 and 30.2 percent respectively, Greenlight’s 
“others” should have hit 15.2 percent, while Slavs constituted just 4.8 
percent of Canadian residents in 1941. But as units with the most 
a w l — w p g , c d f , r m r , and 24th r c a — boasted the most non-British 
and non-French men— 58, 33, 55, and 40 percent respectively—  
Greenlight’s problems went beyond the divide of Canada’s “two 
solitudes.”97
The linguistic rift was present as a h s  recorded Greenlight’s 
history. On 1 May 1943, Pacific Command had asked a h s  for an 
historical officer “to produce a connected narrative of the Pacific 
Command including Alaska.” Nicholson, an officer in the Prince 
Albert and Battleford Volunteers, was assigned the Greenlight 
narrative, ordered by n d h q  on 29 September, by a h s  Director A.F. 
Duguid based on a recommendation from Canada’s Army School of
96 Director SSD, “Morale in the Canadian Army (September 1943),” 9 November 
1943, file 113.3R4003 (D1), DHH.
97 Diary, 7 December 1943, RG24, vol. 14751, 24th RCE War Diary, LAC; 13th Bde 
HQ, “Racial Origins 13 Cdn Inf Bde,” 11 December 1943, RG24, vol. 14165, file 1030, 
LAC; Statistics Canada, Historical Statistics of Canada (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 
1983), Section A: Population and Migration.
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Administration (c a s a ) .98 Present on the west coast by 11 October, 
Nicholson spent three weeks in Alaska, interviewing Canadian and 
American personnel on Kiska, including Drummond and Menard, the 
latter being acting Brigade chief as of 21 October as Foster and Beattie 
had left the island. Arriving at Kiska on 1 November, Nicholson 
found “a strained atmosphere— a feeling of being on edge” at Brigade 
h q . r m r  officers said they “suffered from being last on the list,” while 
all units claimed to be “tremendously understaffed.” Colonel Wilson 
pulled “no punches” about war policy, Menard averred that “I drew 
up all this [BCT plan] myself,” and Nicholson found that “walking 
on Bank Street [in Ottawa] is not sufficient training” to negotiate 
Aleutian tundra.98 9
Duguid told Deputy Chief of General Staff (d c g s ) Training, 
Brigadier M.H.S Penhale, on 8 November about Nicholson’s activities 
and promised a finished narrative a week after Nicholson’s return to 
Ottawa. When Earnshaw and Murchie requested a progress report in 
6 weeks, proving c a s a ’s opinion that “he was a hard and conscientious 
worker,” Nicholson sent an update from Adak on 8 November. After 
interviewing forty-six officers (including Foster), Nicholson asserted 
that “no material pertinent to the operation has been withheld from 
the narrator at any Headquarters that he has visited.” Nicholson 
submitted a draft on 11 December.100 Its 226 paragraphs, 295 
endnotes, and 105 pages of text (excluding appendices) met Stacey’s 
1942 directive that narratives be “businesslike” and that narrators 
should not express opinions but “provide the Official Historian 
with the means to forming opinions.” Greenlight’s withdrawal from 
Kiska compelled Nicholson’s return to b c  on 17 January to gather 
records and conduct more interviews, keeping Nicholson there until
98 Pacific Command, “Historical Section (GS),” 1 May 1943, G.W.L. Nicholson 
Papers, vol. 6, file Personal Memoranda re Nicholson’s Army Career, LAC; Lt. 
Colonel J.C. Hodson, “Confidential report Captain G.W.L. Nicholson,” 29 January 
1943, ibid.; Tim Cook, Clio’s War: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World 
Wars (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2006), 179; Colonel A.F. Duguid 
to Brigadier P. Earnshaw, “Historical narrative— Greenlight Force,” 8 November 
1943, RG24, vol. 31916, file 1453-7, LAC.
99 LRH War Diary, 21 October 1943, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC; Nicholson, “Daily 
Log,” 20 October to 12 November 1943, file 322.009 (D395), DHH.
100 Duguid to Brigadier M.H.S. Penhale plus Earnshaw and Murchie annotations, 8 
November 1943, RG24, vol. 31916, file 1453-7, LAC; Hodson memo, 29 January 1943, 
Nicholson Papers, vol. 6, file Personal Memoranda re Nicholson’s Army Career, LAC; 
Nicholson to Duguid, “Report of preparation of Kiska narrative,” 8 November 1943, 
RG24, vol. 31916, file 1453-7, LAC; Nicholson to Duguid, 11 December 1943, ibid.
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late February. Macklin requested minor corrections, sought better 
explanations of some issues, and rejected firmly Nicholson’s “false 
logic” that airpower had driven Japan from Kiska.101
Macklin did not censor Nicholson’s narrative. That task fell to 
Duguid whose aborted attempts to write a c e f  history since 1921, 
Stacey charged, was “a quarter-century fiasco.” Duguid opposed 
disseminating draft narratives as “nobody then knows where copies 
will get to, who will see them, or to what bad use they may be put 
to.” He lost that fight as generals saw historical narratives as utile 
training tools and expected to be consulted (Stacey did not distribute 
second drafts).102 On 14 October 1944, citing a November 1943 request 
by the u s  army’s Alaskan Department for Greenlight’s narrative in 
return for its report, “The Enemy on Kiska,” a request that Pacific 
Command ratified only in September 1944, Duguid told Penhale that 
Nicholson’s report, “although veracious and appropriate in such a 
historical document prepared for Canadian military authority, may 
not be considered suitable for foreign consumption.” Duguid selected 
five passages and five appendices for deletion, including criticism of 
u s n  crews, s s f  trigger-happiness, and charges of s s f  and u s n  looting 
(Nicholson said that “Canadians were not altogether blameless”). 
Duguid also listed matters reflecting badly upon Canada, including 
desertions, Pearkes’ criticism of training in b c , and l r h ’s role.103
Nicholson’s “Note on Le Regiment de Hull” included Foster’s 
comments about language difficulties, Beattie’s wish for Anglophone 
b c t s , 19th Field Section’s assertion about l r h , plus l r h  complaints 
against Drummond. Nicholson concluded that Menard’s suggestion 
that l r h  act as an f c t  in future operations might “offer a partial 
solution” to problems faced at Kiska even though Nicholson said 
that “nothing approaching a serious condition characterized the 
relationship between French- and English-speaking units.”104 Seeing 
“no point in causing irritation by this type of comment unless for
101 Cook, 98 and 136; Nicholson to Duguid, 22 January, 7 and 21 February 1944, 
RG24, vol. 31916, file 1453-7, LAC; Macklin, “Comments on narrative of the 
Canadian participation in the Kiska narrative,” 3 April 1944, ibid.
102 Stacey to Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes, 7 September 1946, Stacey Papers, 
B91-0013, box 1, file Canadian Official History (General) 1945-49, UTA; Cook, 105; 
Stacey note, 12 February 1944, Stacey Papers, B90-0020, box 16, Notebook 29, UTA.
103 Duguid to Earnshaw, “Greenlight Force preliminary narrative,” 14 October 
1944, RG24, vol. 31916, file 1453-7, LAC; Nicholson Report, paragraph 210, file 
595.013 (D2), DHH.
104 Nicholson Report, Appendix 54, file 595.013 (D2), DHH.
36
Canadian Military History, Vol. 24 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol24/iss2/4
P E R R A S : 95
some historical purpose,” Penhale offered two recommendations; “all 
passages to which you refer to should be obliterated from the copy sent 
to the USA”; and, “historians should refrain, whenever possible, from 
drawing invidious comparisons, particularly in describing operations 
in which the forces of other nations participate.” Asked if he objected 
to his May 1943 meetings being cited, after consulting u s  officials, 
Pope saw no reason why they “should not stand.” Duguid sent a 
narrative to Penhale on 1 November to transmit to Alaska, relaying 
that “deletions have been made from the narrative and appendices of 
material considered unsuitable for u s  consumption.”105
Nicholson composed a second version which included seven new 
paragraphs about Greenlight’s return to Canada in 1944. Though this 
iteration cut appendices, as its body remained unchanged, Nicholson 
reminded Pacific Command in October 1944 not to forward the 
wrong version to Alaska. Menard had objections. Paragraph 138, 
describing the shift of u s  troops and supplies to Green Beach, failed 
to say that Corlett had handed greater responsibilities to l r h . 
Further, Nicholson did not say state l r h  led Greenlight in donations 
to the Victory Loan campaign.106 None of Greenlight’s narratives—  
the 1943 draft, the 1944 version, and a h q  Report No. 6— included 
Menard’s suggestions despite Stacey’s October 1945 promise that 
“amended copies, incorporating the substance of comments received 
by participants, will be forwarded in due course.”107
Traces of Nicholson’s narrative were in Stacey’s 1955 thirteen- 
page account of Kiska. Such brevity reflected Stacey’s admissions in 
1 9 4 5  that “the scale of the proposed History is limited” even if said 
History required “exhaustive examination of the source materials and 
the preparation of detailed Preliminary Narratives.” Stating that “in 
many cases in the past our work has erred, in practice, on the side of too 
much detail,” Stacey thought it “a pity” that Smith’s reconnaissance 
mission had been rejected as “it gave the enemy the satisfaction of
105 Penhale to Duguid, 16 October 1944, file 322.009 (D397), DHH; Duguid to 
Pope, 19 October 1944, ibid.; Pope to Duguid, 31 October 1944, Ibid.; and Duguid 
to Penhale, 1 November 1944, ibid.
106 Nicholson, “The Canadian Participation in the Kiska Operation,” [Nicholson 
Report Two], 1944, RG24, vol. 31916, file 1453-7, LAC; Nicholson to Bois, 15 
October 1945, ibid.; Menard to Stacey, “Kiska operation preliminary narrative,” 10 
January 1946, ibid.
107 Stacey to CMHQ, 24 October 1945, RG24, vol. 12759, file 24/SOURCES/1/9, 
LAC. See also AHQ Report No. 6, “The Canadian Participation in the Kiska 
Operation,” DHH.
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laughing at us.” Stacey also omitted Nicholson’s deleted topics. That 
choice did not reflect badly on Nicholson. Retained by a h s  after 
1945 despite not being “a Stacey man,” Nicholson, judged by Stacey 
to have “a distinct flair for military history,” composed the history 
of the Canadian army’s campaign in Italy, the only army volume 
Stacey did not complete. Canada’s cabinet debated the 1955 volume 
after Minister of National Defence Ralph Campney complained that 
it “contained some mild criticism of government action, particularly 
in the period immediately and following the outbreak of war in 1939.” 
As cabinet demanded a disclaimer— “opinions expressed were those 
of the historian”— and forbade Stacey to cite comments made by 
foreign visitors or to refer to disagreements between a minister and his 
advisers, Stacey likely opted to avoid other controversial matters too.108
As for Greenlight’s Kiska sojourn, Stacey said the men, plagued 
by a dismal climate that “made the island an acutely unpleasant 
residence,” constructed infrastructure, manned defences, and trained 
“as conditions permitted.”109 In a poem that Nicolson put in an 
appendix, Private McQuatty of 25th Field Ambulance put matters 
more vividly: “Maybe God was tired, when he made this little isle 
... I shall call it Kiska, the Earth shall have a Hell.” Foster, who left 
Kiska in September to attend his dying wife, depicted Kiska as “a 
morale destroying country and no place for soldiers with any sort of 
fighting spirit— too much muck, murk and working parties and no 
women to make them take pride in being men. The Americans go in 
for construction, gang dress and mannerisms. I won’t tolerate it.”110 
French newspapers arrived on 15 September and 5 October. If mail 
was late, as l r h ’s diarist noted on 27 September, morale “is rather 
low.” Every month l r h  troops undertook a week of field firing.111 
When l r h  had left b c , eighty-six of 757 men were “unqualified” with 
the rifle, 451 were unqualified with grenades, 190 had not qualified 
with Bren guns, and 267 lacked tactical training. By 27 October,
108 Stacey, “General instructions on preparation of historical material,” 13 September 
1945, RG24, vol. 12747, file 916.016 (D3), LAC; Stacey, S ix  Y ea r s  o f  W ar, 493-505; 
Cook, 179; Cabinet conclusion, 8 August 1955, Privy Council Office Records, RG2, 
Series A-5-A, Cabinet Conclusions, vol. 2658, LAC.
109 Stacey, S ix  Y ea rs  o f  W ar, 505.
110 Stacey, S ix  Y ea rs  o f  W ar, 505; Private McQuatty, “Kiska,” Nicholson Report, 
Appendix 46, file 595.013 (D2), DHH; diary, 19 and 24 August 1943, Foster Diary.
111 LRH War Diary, 15 & 27 September 1943, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC; LRH War 
Diary, 5 October 1943, ibid., LAC; Menard, “Reports on Kiska operation,” 1944, 
LRH War Diary, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC.
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matters were better but 22 and 34 percent remained unqualified in 
grenade use and tactical training. Singing continued. When Pearkes 
visited Kiska in November, he “rejoiced in our sing songs French and 
English” and an l r h  choir serenaded troops at Christmas mass.112
As Origene Poulin recalled, with some hyperbole, “the first month 
we were there, I would say it rained twenty-four hours a day. We were 
wet. No part of our bodies was untouched by water.” Snow came on 
1 November, prompting l r h ’s diarist to seek greater coal rations and 
wooden floors for tents as “it is very cold in living quarters.” Powerful 
williwaw winds caused havoc; a gale of 110 miles per hour ruined 128 
w p g  tents on 6 November. Summing up on 31 October, Brigade h q ’s 
diarist said the average daily wind velocity was twenty-two miles 
per hour, fog was present thirteen days in October, and overcast 
dominated 65 percent of the time. The maximum temperature was 
fifty degrees Fahrenheit, the minimum twenty-nine, the overall 
average forty-two. Omnipresent mud was “unrecordable.”113
While the u s  Army Transportation Corps relayed on 27 October 
that Greenlight would leave in six stages starting on 16 November, an 
advance party did not depart Kiska until 21 November. w p g , c d f , s j f , 
plus small units left on 24 December, 24th r c a  went on 1 January, 
and the last Canadian troops, r m r  plus support troops, sailed on 12 
January. l r h  sailed from Kiska on 6 January, arrived at Vancouver 
twelve days later, and moved to Vernon on 19 January. Many men 
went into “town during the evening.”114 Iannuccilli’s courage on David 
Branch was lauded by Vancouver Province, the paper adding that l r h  
men mocked the hardships on an island that Company Sergeant Major 
(c s m ) Wilfred Desormeaux called “a hell of a hole.” Desormeaux’s 
major complaint was a lack of “cokes” on Kiska.115
112 Menard, “Training report,” 27 September 1943, LRH War Diary, RG24, vol. 
15183, LAC; Menard, “Training report,” 27 October 1943, LRH War Diary, Ibid., 
LAC; LRH War Diary, 7 November 1943, ibid., LAC; 13th Bde HQ diary, 25 
December 1943, RG24, vol. 14165, file 1030, LAC.
113 Poulin transcript, online at www.thememoryproject.com.stories/2193:origene- 
poulin/ downloaded 4 December 2013; LHR War Diary, 2 November 1943, RG24 
vol. 15183, LAC; diary, 6 November 1943, 24th RCE War Diary, RG24, vol. 14751, 
LAC; Nicholson Report, paragraph 180, file 595.013 (D2), DHH; 13th Bde HQ diary, 
25 December 1943, RG24, vol. 14165, file 1030, LAC.
114 Lt. Colonel J.A. Barthrop memorandum, 27 October 1943, file 322.009 (D878), 
DHH; Nicholson Report Two, 1944, paragraphs 228-232, RG24, vol. 31916, file 1453­
7, LAC; LRH War Diary, 6-19 January 1944, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC.
115 “Munitions Ship Saved by Alert French-Canadian,” and “Troops ‘Dig-In’ at 
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Greenlight was implicated in u s  plans to invade the Kurile Islands. 
After discussing the possibility with DeWitt on 5 July 1943, Pearkes told 
Currie that Kiska was the “first step to Tokyo and that Canada should 
be prepared to follow it up and stay with it to the end.” On 9 August, 
Pearkes wanted three Canadian brigade groups to assault the Kuriles 
and saw “great political value” in employing a Francophone brigade. 
Having directed n d h q  on 31 May to study division-level operations 
for the Aleutians, the Southwest Pacific, and Asia’s mainland, Stuart 
asked Ralston on 31 August to retain three battle-ready brigades for 
Pacific operations. Ralston agreed, but such hopes died on 12 October 
when c w c  decided to bring Greenlight home.116 17
Given France’s imminent invasion, pressure was mounting to 
convert h d  men to g s  volunteers. Of the 150,000 conscripts (15 
percent of Canada’s military), just 64,297 volunteered for overseas 
service. Menard, however, did not spur l r h  recruiting. Instead, when 
l r h  got “a long awaited furlough” from 23 January to 22 February, 
Menard traveled to Britain to lobby Stuart for a combat command. 
Uncertain if Menard had recovered from his Dieppe wounds, the 
army gave him command of an advanced infantry training centre and 
later made him director of infantry at n d h q .117 Led by St. Laurent, 
l r h  settled in to “route marches, bayonet fighting, lectures, etc., the 
old routine rolling again” and appreciated frequent movies with “so 
little to do in” Vernon. l r h  underwent more changes as St. Laurent 
took special leave on 3 March and personnel left for a jungle warfare 
course. Ten lieutenants arrived on 13 March, and Jacques left on 
15 March for Marine training in Virginia. l r h  also underwent a 
unit inspection. St. Laurent received plaudits for knowing his officers 
“very well” and his efforts to create “an efficient fighting unit.” Short 
twelve officers, St. Laurent opined that five new lieutenants were 
unsuitable for overseas service while Cadotte’s r s m  successor, “not 
outstanding,” could go to Europe. Few n c o s , just “fair” as a group,
116 Galen Roger Perras, “Eyes on the Northern Route to Japan: Plans for Canadian 
Participation in an Invasion of the Kurile Islands— A Study in Coalition Warfare and 
Civil-Military Relationships,” W ar &  S o c ie ty  8 (May, 1990), 106-113.
117 Daniel Byers, “Canada’s Zombies: A Portrait of Canadian Conscripts and Their 
Experiences During the Second World War,” in Bernd Horn, ed., F o r g in g  A  N a tio n :  
P e r s p e c t iv e s  o n  th e  C a n a d ia n  M ili ta r y  E x p e r ie n c e  (St. Catharines: Vanwell, 2002), 
155 and 163; LRH War Diary, 23 January 1944, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC; Vennat, 
G e n e r a l D o lla r d  M e n a r d , 164-172; “Name Dieppe Hero Military Attache,” H a m ilto n  
S p e c ta to r , 13 September 1947.
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wished to be g s  but that situation could improve. However, sixty-five 
o r  s were absent when furlough ended on 22 February, l r h ’s Diary 
saying only that “some men are still on leave without permission.” 
The Inspector-General noted— confirmed by St. Laurent— a feeling 
among “all personnel” that l r h  lacked proper “recognition” for its 
Greenlight role.118
On 3 April, l r h  heard that it would go overseas “if sufficient n r m a  
personnel” went g s . This “campaign of enlightenment,” l r h ’s diarist 
said, would begin immediately, adding ominously on 5 April “it looks 
like a hard nut to crack, this home defensive mentality.” While Pearkes 
commended w p g  in Victoria on 5 April for its “magnificent job” on 
Kiska, he sent Victoria Cross winner Major Paul Triquet of Royal 22e 
Regiment to Vernon. Participating grudgingly, Triquet told l r h  that 
“their blood brothers overseas were looking to them for help relief and 
encouragement”; twenty-five men signed up.119 While Macklin was 
disappointed, thirty to fifty brigade men went g s  daily until 15 April 
when recruiting “slumped badly.” When Pearkes came to Vernon on 
29 April, Macklin reported that padres, including l r h ’s Father A.M. 
Tessier, had obtained few volunteers as “resistance of n r m a  soldiers 
to enlistment was amazingly strong.” With battalion commanders 
demanding court-martials for hard core resisters, Macklin instead 
shifted 200 men to a camp boasting stricter training and discipline. 
He also transferred two l r h  c s m  s, demoted “several sergeants and 
corporals,” while others voluntarily reverted in rank. While all units 
had problems, 95 percent of l r h ’s o r  s were n r m a  (other units ranged 
from 85 to 90 percent); l r h  had the most a w l  men, sixty-five (r m r  
had eight, c d f  twenty; and l r h  morale plummeted as n r m a  men, 
certain that Ottawa would not shift them overseas, wanted farm and 
factory work. By 19 April, 1,973 of 13th Brigade troops were active, 
but l r h , with 295 g s  men, was behind c d f  (477), w p g  (484), and
118 LRH War Diary, 1-15 March 1944, 24 February 1944, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC; 
Major General J.P. Mackenzie, “Abridged report of the inspection 1st Bn Le 
Regiment de Hull,” 6 April 1944, file 322.009 (D485), DHH.
119 LRH War Diary, 3-4 and 11 April 1944, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC; “Pearkes Tells 
Kiska Men of Other Tasks Ahead,” Victoria Times, 6 April 1944; John MacFarlane, 
Triquet’s Cross: A Story of Military Heroism (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2009), 96-97.
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r m r  (579). After subtracting 1,649 volunteers who reported to 13th 
Brigade after 1 April, just 370 Greenlight men had gone active.120
Pearkes, “closer to the men” than Macklin according to Reginald 
Roy, told l r h  on 20 April that he saw “a great opportunity for 
his Kiska boys to do a further job for their country and show the 
world their eagerness to speed victory.” Although g s  men rose to 
2,432— l r h ’s share was 473— Greenlight’s volunteer level remained 
stuck at 370 and l r h ’s improvement reflected its absorption of two 
g s  companies from Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke and Les Fusiliers St- 
Laurent (f s l ) by 25 April, the same day that 100 l r h  men went to 
Macklin’s camp. According to Macklin, l r h  recruited only 150 of its 
men though “not for any lack of effort” by St. Laurent, Tessier, and 
Triquet (Major Black counted eighty-seven l r h  Kiska men as going 
g s ). As w p g , the most successful unit, had just 38 percent of its 
original men volunteer, Macklin saw little chance to alter anti-army 
feelings among draftees.121 St. Laurent agreed. Despite sequestering 
“vociferous obstructionists,” the “preponderant group ... never 
trained from childhood to make important decisions or to think for 
themselves” and “strongly attached to women’s apron strings with 
a childish simplicity,” would fight if sent but would not volunteer. 
Some were “a fraternity” who would never sign on, others had an 
“antiquated ingrained objection” to fighting for England, while l r h  
lacked “civic or local pride” as repeated transfers meant many men 
were not from Hull. St. Laurent saw just one solution; instituting 
compulsory service overseas.122
On 2 May 1944, n d h q  ordered l r h  to Britain as a g s  unit. Three 
hundred conscripts were transferred out and g s  men got embarkation 
leave until 16 May when l r h  would shift to Halifax. Thirty men 
missed the train, seven deserted on 25 May, and 474 l r h  men arrived 
in Britain on 2 June. l r h  men went to depleted front-line units in 
Normandy, leaving just 191 personnel by 31 July. On 12 November, l r h ’s
120 Macklin to Pearkes, “Mobilization of the 13th Bde on an Active Basis,” 2 May 
1944, file 322.009 (D50), DHH.
121 Roy, 211; LRH War Diary, 20, 13, & 25 April 1944, RG24, vol. 15183, LAC; 
Macklin to Pearkes, 2 May 1944, file 322.009 (D50), DHH; diary, 25 June 1944, in 
Black and Perras, 183.
122 St. Laurent, “Enrolling NRMA personnel for active service 1st Bn Le Regiment 
de Hull CA,” Appendix A attached to Macklin to Pearkes, 2 May 1944, file 322.099 
(D50), DHH.
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remnants joined Number 4 Canadian Infantry Training Regiment.123 
l r h  briefly courted controversy in July 1944 when Ralston rebuffed 
a request by Howard Green, a Progressive Conservative Member of 
Parliament, to see Pacific Command recruiting reports. Although 
that political exchange cited no units, Toronto Globe and Mail cited 
charges by 133 former l r h  soldiers that they faced discrimination for 
declining to volunteer.124 Firing Ralston, King chose on 22 November 
to send 16,000 n r m a  troops overseas. A  day later, 200 f s l  troops in 
b c  boycotted parade, removed weapons from storage, and demanded 
FSL’s dissolution plus the rescinding of Ottawa’s n r m a  decision, a 
“rebellion” that ended peacefully when Pearkes refused to employ 
force. While l r h  officers told reporters in November 1944 that their 
unit was now active and that l r h  men had risked their lives at Kiska, 
n r m a  desertions, 1,235 in 1944 (393 in November-December) surged 
to 3,702 in 1945, with 2,252 in January-February.125
In 1964, l r h  issued a fiftieth anniversary souvenir program. 
Kiska merited just one paragraph; “Notre Regiment s’est acquis une 
reputation tres enviable parmi les troupes canado-americaine a cet 
endroit.” Rethinking that assertion, l r h ’s seventy-fifth anniversary 
program said “le Regiment n’a pas eu a combatre; il n’en a pas moins 
du supporter pendant six mois des conditions atmospheriques d’une 
rigeur extreme.” Had Japan not abandoned Kiska, l r h  might have 
lived up to the expansive 1964 claim. But as Menard rued in January 
1944, “when we got there, the cupboard was bare.”126
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